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Abstract 
The world of work has changed. To keep up, vocational psychologists have adopted a greater 
emphasis on career adaptability, which relies on possessing transferable skills that will remain 
useful regardless of job context. Adaptable clients successfully translate idiosyncratic interests 
into transferable skills by taking advantage of certain occupational and educational opportunities. 
In order to do so, clients must choose among the myriad options available in the information age. 
What influences these choices and how they may be optimized are questions of primary interest 
to vocational psychologists. Decision-making theories and methodologies from the areas of 
cognitive and social psychology have been applied to career adaptability through the Anti-
introspectivist approach and Trilateral Model of adaptive career decision-making, which 
postulate both intuitive and rational systems are necessary for adaptability. One-hundred forty 
participants chose among a variety of videos after either an unconscious-intuitive, conscious-
rational, or decision-as-usual information processing manipulation. Interest levels were assessed 
at three time points, before, during, and after watching the chosen video in order to determine 
which decision strategy produced more effective results. Level of occupational engagement and 
decision-making styles were also considered as potential moderators. Overall, previous levels of 
occupational engagement were found to be related to decisional quality, but this finding was 
pronounced only for the control group. Results suggest that decisions made after being immersed 
in decision-relevant stimuli and a period of unconscious thought were marginally more effective 
than decisions made as usual. Interest levels produced by intuitive choices were recalled more 
accurately at a two weeks follow-up than hyper-rational or control decisions. Results imply that 
career decision-makers may be better served by adopting decisional strategies that promote 
experiential engagement with options over those that rely on “thinking through” decisions. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Only experience provides knowledge,  
all else just provides information. – Albert Einstein 
In times past, the vocational landscape was amenable to single, circumscribed, secure 
career identities, in which definitive skills were required for certain positions. Entire careers 
could be spent not only in the same field, but with the same company, interacting with the same 
information, monitoring the same processes, and doing the same tasks (Blustein, 2006). It was 
quite easy to equip a person for a certain field by recommending particular training toward a 
specific skill set. Vocational psychology emerged in this stable and hierarchical environment. 
Parsons‟ (1909) Trait-Factor Approach postulated that the person-environment fit was integral 
for selecting the single best career for an individual. Career counselors needed only to select 
important information about the individual, select important information about the world of work, 
and then synthesize the two. Some version of this model has dominated vocational theory for the 
past century (Savickas, 2000), and it is still the dominant model in practice (James & Gilliland, 
2003). This approach assumes that careers can be neatly abstracted into relevant descriptions, 
and that the decision-maker can accurately assess and report a number of self-relevant factors, 
such as their interests. It further assumes that decisions are reached through a rational 
contemplation and analysis of these two areas.   
Simplified paradigms, such as Parsons‟ (1909), have become out-dated (Krieshok, 1998; 
Savickas, 2000). The world of work is no longer amenable to a stable, predictable career path 
(Blustein, 2006; Friedman, 2005; Savickas, 2000), and recent research indicates that individuals 
are not – nor should they attempt to be – the reductionistic, rational agents implied by this model 
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(Black, 2006; Gilbert, 2006; Krieshok, 1998; Wilson, 2002). Vocational psychologists now view 
the external world of work as chaotic, erratic, and inherently unpredictable at the level of the 
individual worker (Krumboltz, 2009). Likewise, social scientists now view the internal 
experiences of the individual as often contradictory, irrational, emotionally charged, and largely 
occurring outside of conscious awareness. These realizations have lead theorists like Krieshok, 
Black and McKay (2009) to challenge the assumptions, methods, and goals of traditional career 
counseling.  
In times past, the goal of career counseling could be said to seek the answer to the 
question, “What career fits you best?” Based on a new relationship with the changing world of 
work, however, individuals may be best served by answering the question, “What skill-building 
tasks interest you the most?” (Savickas, 2000). Interests can be defined as latent emotional 
reactions that inspire continued approach behaviors despite discomfort or risk. Committing 
oneself to any learning endeavor comes with a number of psychological hazards, including fear 
of failure, embarrassment, boredom, or anxiety about the unknown and concern regarding 
shifting personal identity. In fact, any attempt to learn entails first admitting ignorance, which 
can be all the more daunting if the topic is one of personal importance. In order to enhance one‟s 
career-related skills and knowledge base, it is necessary to act on opportunities that promise to 
sustain one‟s attention and motivation through untoward psychological states. Interest provides 
the ability to do so. In a highly fluid world of work, it is clearly advantageous for workers to 
constantly expand their cache of transferable occupational skills in order to meet unexpected 
challenges.  
The concept of “career adaptability” has become prominent in the vocational psychology 
literature in order to encapsulate these ideas (Super & Knasel, 1981). This approach emphasizes 
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the accumulation and recalibration of skill sets that are both enjoyable and potentially 
transferable in order to keep up with a fluid occupational landscape. Adaptable workers realize 
that throughout a lifetime, people have countless opportunities to learn. With every interaction 
with the world, we are generating, refining, enhancing, adapting, or practicing a particular set of 
skills. Doing so actively and mindfully allows one to keep up with a shifting work-space 
(Ebberwein, Kreishok, Ulven, & Prosser, 2004; Savickas, 1997; Super & Knasel, 1981).  
Adaptable workers may be understood not as individuals who search for skills in order to 
attain a singular lifelong profession, but as individuals who seek to enhance or generate skills in 
which they have intrinsic interest and then utilize them whenever occupational circumstances 
allow or new opportunities arise (Blustein, 2006; Bolles, 2009; Krieshok et al., 2009; Krumboltz, 
2009). They are able to translate psychological interests into manifest skills. It is imperative that 
vocational psychologists understand how individuals appraise their own interests and choose 
between the myriad educational and occupational options available in the information age. In 
order to be effective, both career counselors and job seekers need to know how individuals can 
optimize these decisions. Failure to choose wisely can result in lost time and resources, 
decreased efficacy, frustration, regret, and lost opportunities. This study sought to determine how 
individuals can and should appraise occupational/educational options vis-à-vis their idiosyncratic 
interests and values.  
Recent theoretical advances in the field of vocational psychology have incorporated 
foundational research from the areas of cognitive and social psychology (e.g., Krieshok et al., 
2009), as vocational decisions can be conceptualized as a specific type of self-referent decision 
(Black, 2006). Most assessments and techniques in vocational psychology have assumed, as did 
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Parsons (1909), the accuracy and utility of a rational self-report of one‟s interests and abilities 
(Savickas, 2000). This assumption has been challenged. 
Several research programs indicate that individuals do not make optimal decisions when 
using a rational decision-making strategy, which is characterized by a reductionistic, conscious, 
deliberative approach (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Gilbert, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1996; Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson, 2002). Furthermore, there is evidence that intuitive decision-
making - choosing based on implicit knowledge, or „gut-feelings‟ - can result in better decisions 
(Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2005; Gergrinzer, 2007; Kahneman & Klein, 2009), especially if those 
decisions have affective components (Gilbert, 2006; Iyengar, Wells & Schwartz, 2006; Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2005). Predicting what activities will hold one‟s interest is an aspect of “affective 
forecasting.” Affective forecasts are predictions about future emotional states based on the 
consequences of one‟s choices. It seems that failures in this task are common (Gilbert, 2006), 
and likely to be compounded when predictions are reduced to components and evaluated 
sequentially, as is done in rational decision-making (Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002). These 
concepts have been explicitly linked to vocational decision-making and career counseling by 
Krieshok‟s (1998) Anti-introspective Approach.  
Krieshok and his colleagues‟ (2009) Trilateral Model acknowledges the role of both 
intuitive and rational processes. This model posits that intuition, rationality, and engagement 
must all be present to produce an adaptive career decision. Engagement is defined as “taking part 
in behaviors that contribute to the career decision-maker‟s fund of information and experience of 
the larger world, not just the world as processed when a career decision is imminent” (p. 285). 
Engagement, therefore, is a powerful force because it effectively informs both rational and 
intuitive processes. Experimental evidence supporting the distinction between intuitive and 
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rational processes in the realm of career decision-making, as well as the mechanism by which 
engagement interacts with these systems, however, has yet to be defined. It is vital that 
vocational psychology understand not only how individuals make decisions, but how they 
answer the question, “What activities will I find interesting?” This can be considered a specific 
type of affective forecast, an interest forecast.  
A further explication of these concepts is among the contributions of this study. Social 
psychology theory and methods (e.g., Wilson et al., 1993) were applied to in order to determine 
how well individuals can forecast how interesting and enjoyable they will find an 
educational/occupational video using different decision-making strategies. Theoretical 
distinctions between rational and intuitive strategies are derived from “dual-processing” models 
of human cognition. Models such as the Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 
Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1994), Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT; Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006), and Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) describe two discrete 
but interacting modes of information processing. One is conscious-rational, the other 
unconscious-intuitive. Although nuanced differences abound between theories, Evans (2008) 
concluded that “almost all authors agree on a distinction between processes that are unconscious, 
rapid, automatic, and high-capacity [unconscious-intuitive processes], and those that are 
conscious, slow, and deliberative [conscious-rational processes]” (p. 256). Generally, the 
conscious-rational system is considered to be precise, logical, abstract, and reductionistic, while 
the unconscious-intuitive system is considered to be fuzzy, emotional, concrete, and holistic 
(Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Wilson, 2002).  
Given the changing world of work, vocational psychologists must increasingly focus on 
placing clients in a position to build a large collection of diverse and transferable skills. Clients 
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must invest precious time and resources into these educational or occupational opportunities. It is 
therefore essential that vocational psychologists understand exactly how one decides what skill-
building activities are worth pursuing. Workers offered different training “tracks,” non-
traditional students returning to school, college students deciding on classes and majors, 
unemployed workers hoping to build skills, unsatisfied employees looking for greater fulfillment 
from their jobs – all must choose where to invest scarce and valuable resources. These choices 
will build the skills that influence their opportunities and identities.  
A review of the literature revealed a number of conclusions that serve as the basis of this 
study: 1) there is theoretical support for distinguishing conscious-rational and unconscious-
intuitive modes of information processing, 2) these systems can be experimentally manipulated, 
3) viewing these as distinct systems meaningfully relates to both the objective and subjective 
quality of one‟s decisions, 4) these systems can be differentially applied to optimize interest 
forecasts, and 5) in a specific test of previous literature, it is hypothesized that intuitive decisions 
produce more effective interest forecasts than do hyper-rational ones.  
If vocational psychologists strive to foster adaptability, vocational psychologists must 
understand how individuals translate appraisals of their own interests, goals and values into 
actionable choices in occupational/educational world. The purpose of the current study was to 
test the success of interest forecasts made under unconscious-intuitive and conscious-rational 
decision-making conditions. The methodology employed also allowed for the exploration of 
which conditions are likely to result in optimal educational/occupational decisions, and how 
those choices are perceived over time.  
Two general research questions guided the conceptualization of this project. First, does a 
history of engagement behaviors influence the quality of one‟s interest forecasts under novel 
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experimental conditions? Second, do conscious-rational, unconscious-intuitive and control pre-
decision information processing strategies produce discernibly different patterns of results over 
time? That is, when choosing one of many different experiential options, do the different 
strategies influence the decider‟s ability to choose optimally and their ability to make meaning of 
that decision over time? To explicate these questions and based on the available literature, three 
hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis 1: Levels of previous occupational engagement behaviors, as 
measured by the Occupational Engagement Scale – Student (Cox, 2008), will be 
related to the quality of ones decisions, as measured by self-reported interest level 
during that experience. Furthermore, this relationship is expected to be more 
pronounced when participants are forced to rely on their fund of intuitive 
knowledge, indicating engagement primarily functions on the experiential system. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals will make more effective interest forecasts (i.e., better 
choices), as measured by reported interest levels during that experience, when 
decision-relevant data are presented in a manner amenable to unconscious-
intuitive information processing strategies than those when the data are presented 
in a manner amenable to a conscious-rational or decision-as-usual (control) 
approach.  
Hypothesis 3: Individuals engaging in conscious-rational, unconscious-intuitive 
and control decisional strategies will display markedly different self-reported 
interest levels over time.  
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Summary 
 It has become increasingly clear that the external world of work is highly chaotic, 
unstable and unpredictable at the level of individual worker (e.g., Krumboltz, 2009). Likewise, 
social psychological research has increasingly supported theories that describe the internal world 
of a human decision-maker in a similarly confusing, non-rational fashion (e.g., Gilbert, 2006). 
This state of affairs has placed a premium on transferable skills and adaptability, but left 
vocational psychologists with potentially outmoded tactics to guide decisions. The current study 
is an attempt to marry the decision-making models produced by experimental social psychology 
with applied vocational psychology in order to better understand how individuals can effectively 
translate latent interest into effective choices. The results of this study can be considered 
foundational experimental support for a post-rational theory of career counseling. Such a theory 
would serve as a basis for interventions that are more robust and helpful, given the current state 
of the decision-making and vocational fields (Krieshok, Motl & Rutt, 2011).   
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Chapter II 
Review of the Literature 
 The review of the literature has been divided into seven major sections. The first is an 
overview intended to be an orientation to the two lines of research that intersect in the current 
study: decision-making and vocational psychology. The second is a general discussion of 
decision-making, focusing specifically on several pertinent “dual-processing models” of 
information processing. The third discusses the two mechanisms by which these two systems can 
theoretically be manipulated: overwhelming and bypassing the conscious-rational system. The 
fourth delves in the various studies that have pitted the two systems against one another in a 
direct comparison of their attributes. In the two subsections within this segment, these studies 
were divided into those that have objective and those that have subjective consequences. The 
fifth section focuses on how these findings have previously been applied to vocational 
psychology by the Trilateral Model of Adaptive Career Decision-Making (Krieshok et al., 2009) 
and anti-introspective approaches (e.g., Krieshok, 1998). The sixth describes the fusion of the 
two lines of inquiry by introducing interest forecasting, an affective forecast of particular 
concern to vocational psychologists. This construct is then exemplified by a short story. The 
seventh and final section is a summary and synthesis of the above literature.  
Overview 
Career decisions can be conceptualized as a specific type of decision (Krieshok et al., 
2009). Appropriateness of one‟s career decisions has been an explicit component of most 
prominent vocational theories (e.g., Holland, Sorensen, Clack, Nafziger, & Blum, 1973; 
Krumboltz, 2009; Parsons, 1909; Super, 1980). Trait-factor matching, the most commonly 
practiced technique in career-counseling, explicitly promotes deliberative inspection of client 
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goals, values, and needs in order to determine the job with the greatest personal congruence 
(Holland et al., 1973; James & Gilliland, 2003). Vocational psychologists laboring under this 
general paradigm often seek to help their clients by coaching them through the deliberation 
process. The goal of career counseling is to help clients think more rigorously and systematically 
about themselves and their situation. This process often invokes the pro and con “balance sheet” 
method of decision-making (Janis & Mann, 1977), or similar quantification, calculation, and 
comparison of subjective experiences acquired through introspection. For instance, Brown and 
Lent (1996) describe the central goal of Social Cognitive Career Counseling as helping facilitate 
client deliberation by “actively assessing discrepancies between self-efficacy and demonstrated 
skill and between outcome expectations and occupational information” (p. 357). When 
discussing the role of strategic deliberation in career counseling, Krieshok (1998) noted that “all 
of the available prescriptive models mandate self-knowledge,” presumably gained through 
introspection and self-observation (p. 215).  
Just as changes in the world of work have forced individuals to reconsider how they 
should orient themselves to career decisions, changes in the way we understand the 
psychological mechanisms of the decision-making process have forced us to reconsider some 
previously held assumptions about how people choose between options. The hyper-rational and 
introspective approach implicitly or explicitly promoted by most practices of career counseling 
has been assailed by many current researchers (i.e., Gilbert, 2006; Wilson, 2002). Phillips (1997) 
stated that, „„those who have considered what actually happens in the decision-making process 
have offered the nearly unanimous conclusion that rational decision making simply does not 
reflect the decider‟s reality” (p.278). Furthermore, when reflecting on the past two decades of 
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research, Klein (2003) noted that the “thorough, systematic, rational, and scientific” model of 
decision-making is “a myth . . . that simply does not work very well in practice.” (p. 20).  
Decision-Making 
 In 1956, George Miller determined that the human consciousness can hold, give or take a 
couple, seven pieces of information at any one time. Seven pieces of information corresponds to 
roughly 2.8 bits of data, a bit being the smallest unit of meaningful information, which is 
expressed as yes/no or presence/absence binary. More recent studies have provided further 
evidence of the limitation of consciousness. There are some differences as to the exact numeric 
value of the information load of human consciousness, but the most plausible accounts range 
between 20-60 bits per second (Tononi, 2004). To put this number in context, our senses alone 
receive roughly 11 million bits per second, and our physical output is similarly massive 
(Norretranders, 1997). This means that only a miniscule amount, most likely less than one-
millionth, of cognitive work is done consciously. Based on his work, Miller‟s student, Herbert 
Simon (1955, 1990) developed the Theory of Bounded Rationality to account for the systematic 
deficiencies of human decision-making. Humans, Simon found, utilize oceans of information. 
Conscious awareness, however, comprises only a few drops of that ocean. As individuals move 
through the world, they do so unaware of precisely what information they possess and process.  
 Dual-Processing Theories. In an attempt to explain how this occurs, the last two 
decades have seen an explosion of “dual-processing” theories of cognition that define two 
separate cognitive processes. Dual-processing theories assert that cognitive work is divided 
between two discrete processes (Evans, 2008). One system has been referred to as conscious, 
controlled, rational, explicit, analytic, rule-based and higher order. It is this slow, effortful, low 
capacity process that Miller (1956) originally described. The second system has a different set of 
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characteristics: unconscious, automatic, heuristic, intuitive, holistic, associative, and impulsive. 
This system is commonly believed to be limitless and pre-symbolic, meaning that it is not 
restricted by capacity or language (Evans, 2008). The activities of this system, cannot, by 
definition, be reported by the individual. They can only be logically inferred from the actions of 
that person (Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2005). 
However defined, research from an array of fields have converged to form a general 
consensus that not only does a nonconscious cognitive system exist, but plays an indispensable 
role in human decision-making and goal setting (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Kahneman, 
2003; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2003). Some of the most pertinent of the dual processing 
theories will be reviewed.  
 Perhaps the most famous dual-processing model grew out of the intersection between 
economics and psychology. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1996) were among the first to 
delineate the difference between the two systems. The researchers set out on a course of research 
to support Simon‟s (1955) work. Several of their studies revealed that both experts and 
laypersons alike had difficulty coming to logical conclusions when attempting to solve problems 
under some degree of uncertainty. It was soon clear to the pair that most decisions were not 
simply the product of careful reason (Kahneman, 2003).  
 In the intervening years, a robust research base has supported the conclusion that 
individuals habitually and systematically distort reality, misuse heuristics, and fall victim to 
unfounded personal biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Called “heuristics-and-biases,” this 
line of research has cataloged the systematic and consistent ways individuals fail to optimize 
outcomes. The inability to follow basic rules of logic often prevents individuals from optimal 
decision-making, thereby reducing personal gain. As Ariely (2008) noted, however, irrational 
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decisions are not necessarily random or illogical ones, but appear to be a hallmark of human 
cognition. Pure rationality, Ariely contends, simply does not reflect the way humans orient 
themselves to the choices they face.  
This directly contradicts Rational Choice Theory (RCT), an implicit assumption of the 
Standard Social Science Model (Miller & Kanazawa, 2008; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). RCT is 
the foundation for both modern economic theory and the principles postulated to govern human 
decision-making in general and career decision-making in particular (Krieshok, 1998). RCT 
states that individuals and institutions logically weigh costs and benefits of available options, and 
choose the routes that maximize the utility of their positions. By challenging RCT, Kahneman 
and Tversky were awarded the Nobel Prize for economics in 2002. This line of research also 
helped launch the field of behavioral economics, which has revolutionized economic theory by 
applying post-rational paradigms to traditional economic contexts (Ariely, 2008).  
 Based on this work, and borrowing terms from Stanovich and West (2000), Kahneman 
(2003) postulated that there are two separate systems at work during any decision-making 
process: an intuitive process, System 1, and a reasoned process, System 2. System 1 operates 
nonconsciously, is fast, automatic, effortless, associative, changes slowly, is emotionally charged, 
and can calculate in parallel. By contrast, System 2 is conscious, controlled, effortful, rule-
governed, flexible, emotionless, and must calculate in serial. Kahneman concluded that 
distortions, heuristics and biases simultaneously disrupt the intuitive processes of System 1, 
while inspiring false confidence in the rational processes of System 2, resulting in suboptimal 
decision-making. System 2, the rational system, does not do well in situations of high complexity 
and uncertainty – instances in which individuals may quickly adopt heuristics as a decision-
making strategy.  Errors increase when individuals are not given a chance to practice decisions 
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under such seemingly chaotic conditions, or when the context does not supply feedback 
conducive to learning (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).   
Another dual-processing theory, the Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST), grew 
out of psychodynamic theory. Proposed by Epstein (1994), CEST employed more psychological 
descriptors to the two systems, which he named the experiential system (conceptually similar to 
System 1) and the rational system (conceptually similar to System 2). Epstein described the two 
as “parallel and interacting systems” (p. 709). Again, one system, the rational system, is 
conscious; the other, the experiential, is nonconscious. The experiential system acts quickly, but 
changes slowly; the rational acts slowly but is very flexible. The experiential system traffics in 
concrete images, gestalts, gists, and self-schema; while the rational trades in abstract symbols, 
words and precise numbers. The experiential system is holistic, context-driven and highly 
affective; the rational system is logical and functions without emotion. Emotional experience – 
province of the experiential system – needs no justification. Logic and abstraction – the province 
of the rational system – must be carefully buttressed with facts and inference.  
Epstein (1994) claimed that interaction with the world affects both systems. Conscious 
beliefs are formed by the rational system, and intuitive schemata are formed by the experiential. 
Schemata represent an efficient way to quickly organize information and recognize patterns, but 
are not under conscious control. They are largely a result of previous experience, especially those 
that are highly affective and meaningful (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Intuition as a form of 
schematic pattern recognition has been largely supported by theory (e.g., Kahneman & Klein, 
2009). Research indicates, though, that attempting to consciously activate and modify schemata 
is neither possible nor effective (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). It is schematic, then, only 
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inasmuch as it is based on patterns of repeated experience, and is not based on consciously 
desired, predetermined outcomes.  
 CEST tenets were echoed by Koriat (2000), who drew a functional distinction between 
inferential knowledge and experiential knowledge. Inferential knowledge is the result of logical 
cognitive operations. It is an explicit, relatable, theory-based proposition regarding the 
relationships between concepts. Experiential knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of direct 
experience, and may occur without conscious mediation. This type of knowledge is “self-
evident” and produces a vague, unjustified “feeling of knowing” (p. 314). Koriat‟s (2000) and 
Epstein‟s (1994) distinction between knowledge types and processes recalls Zajonc‟s (1980) 
famous observation that “preferences need no inferences” (p. 151), meaning that one‟s emotional 
reactions are inherently unexplainable and beyond logical defense. Experiential-intuitive data is 
purely phenomenological. The structure of language can only faintly refer to its nature.  
 As the CEST model (Epstein, 1994) hypothesizes that the two systems are interactive but 
independent, it is possible to have a characterological preference for one system over the other. 
Epstein et al. (1996) created an instrument based on CEST tenets to examine this possibility. The 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) was developed to assess individual differences in 
information processing styles. This instrument has undergone some revisions, but the original 
ten-item measure, the REI-Short, has two independent but inversely correlated unipolar 
subscales (Epstein et al., 1996). The first measures the proclivity to use a rational information 
processing style (System 1), and is based loosely on the previously validated Need for Cognition 
scales. The second, a Faith in Intuition scale, measures a propensity to trust one‟s “gut feelings” 
and utilize emotion laden cues. Such an arrangement emphasizes the fact that the CEST 
conceptualizes the two systems as fluid tools whose influence may vary between and within 
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individuals. High scores on the rational subscale of the REI have been associated with decisions 
that are more objectively successful (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). High scores on the intuitive 
subscale have been associated with greater satisfaction with one‟s choice (Pretz & Totz, 2007). 
These two systems can come into conflict with one another, and it is often a function of task 
demands as to which will produce more effective results.    
Reyna and Brainerd (1995) have integrated dual-processing concepts into the 
developmental decision-making framework. Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT) is based on the 
distinction between gist and verbatim mental representations of experience. Verbatim 
representations are highly specific but very symbolic, capturing relatable, specific, and 
quantitative details of an experience. This information is literal and superficial. This includes 
verbal and written language, numbers, and pictures (e.g., “I have a 22.4% chance of developing a 
malignant carcinoma”). Gist representations are vague and qualitative, but capture the 
phenomenological impact of a situation. A gist applies meaning to information based on the 
subjective interpretation of a situation. These interpretations are a result of the context, and the 
emotional state, education, culture, experience, and developmental level of the interpreter. This 
interpretation is done nonconsciously, and is consciously accessible and reportable only as a 
finished mental product, which is often summarized in an affective interpretation of that 
experience (e.g., “The doctor gave me some bad news”). Although less specific, this information 
has more meaning, as it has been consumed and processed in context. Extraction of meaning is a 
complex and covert process; the factors of which the meaning maker is oblivious to (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995).  
Decisions can rely on either gist or verbatim knowledge. FTT postulates gist 
representations do little to provide rational support for any decision, but are based on a large 
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summary of relevant knowledge. Verbatim knowledge, however, supplies the facts - the fodder - 
for inferential, conscious reasoning, and can be used to justify a particular decision. 
Developmentally, children rely on verbatim representations of the world. Gist-based knowledge 
bases are only available later. Children do not have the cultural and experience necessary to 
extract meaning from new information. As a result, they are forced to remember a limited 
number of salient specifics (Reyna & Ellis, 1994). Using only a few, decontextualized facts can 
result in the exact errors described by Tversky and Kahneman (1996). Gist-based judgments, on 
the other hand, have been shown to protect against inferential error (Reyna & Mills, 2007). 
Furthermore, an over-reliance on verbatim representations decreases the accuracy of judgments 
regardless of age or expertise (Reyna, Brainerd, Howe, & Kevershan, 1991). In fact, experts rely 
more heavily on poorly operationalized gist-level appraisals than do novices. The ability to form 
intuitive data not only contributes to their expertise, but is indicative of it, as experts have had 
repeated exposure to situations that provide feedback and practice (Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). The 
benefit of such experience exists only as gist-level intuitions, while the accuracy of verbatim 
memory has been shown to be independent of decision-making ability (Brainerd & Reyna, 2007).  
Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT) is essentially a dual-process model, as, according to Reyna 
(2008), “gist and verbatim representations are extracted roughly in parallel and independently” 
(p. 851). The gist-level interpreter/synthesizer corresponds to the nonconscious, experiential 
System 1, while the verbatim memorizer/manipulator is similar to the conscious, rational System 
2. FTT, however, adopts a highly fluid conceptualization of the two processes. Reyna and 
Brainerd (2008) describe gist and verbatim representations as poles on a continuum. Decision-
makers utilize data from various points throughout this continuum when faced with choices. 
Price and Norman (2008) concur with this assertion, and note that intuition may be a result of 
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nonconscious processes, but the gist-level preferences and “gut-feelings” that are products of 
those processes do become conscious. These then become just one piece of data used by 
decision-makers. In contrast to other models of decision-making - and diametrically opposed to 
Rational Choice Theory - FTT researcher Reyna (2004) explicitly “places intuition at the apex of 
development, considering fuzzy intuitive processing more advanced than precise computational 
processing (e.g., trading off risks and rewards)” (p. 60).  
 Social psychologists Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) have advanced the Unconscious 
Thought Theory (UTT), which is considered one of the most radical dual-processing models 
(Evans, 2008). UTT does not postulate two separate systems, per se, but instead describes two 
different processes that labor with the same underlying mechanisms: the unconscious thought 
(UT) process, and the conscious thought (CT) process. This is a minor, but important distinction. 
Unlike all other dual-processing models, the unconscious processes work in the same manner as 
conscious processes, but do so covertly. Both CT and UT processes perform logical operations 
and calculate contingencies in order to solve problems. Both are deliberative. Unconscious 
thought is not a snap judgment based on schemata, but is a thoughtful process of which we are 
simply unaware.  The two processes have unique attributes that have allowed researchers to 
distinguish the two.  
First, known as the capacity principle, conscious thought, also known as working 
memory, is constrained by a remarkably small capacity (Miller, 1956). Although there are many 
methodological problems that accompany quantifying a covert mechanism such as the 
unconscious though process, it appears that it does not suffer from the same capacity limitation 
(Norretranders, 1997; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). In essence, UTT considers any information 
processing that is not done consciously to be a form of unconscious thought. As previously noted, 
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the capacity of working memory is less than 60 bits per second. If conscious awareness is like a 
flashlight shining onto our inner workings, it may only shed light on a tiny portion of the 
machinery. The remaining 11 million bits of information that humans process are, by UTT‟s 
definition, unconscious thoughts (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  
  Second, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, (2006) note that the UT and CT are differentiated by 
the bottom-up-versus-top-down principle. Unconscious thought represents a “bottom-up” 
processing approach, while conscious thought represents a “top-down” processing approach.  An 
expansive amount of evidence indicates consciousness works schematically, establishing 
expectancies before gathering data (Sloman, 2002). This occurs even in high-stakes situations, 
such as murder trials. Instead of waiting until all the facts are in before determining the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant, which would be the optimal strategy, active contemplation of the 
relevant decision-making information is more likely to lead to predecisional distortion, which is 
also known as “jumping to conclusions” (Carlson & Russo, 2001). Even the most open-minded 
jurors fall prey to biased predecisional distortions due to this characteristic of rational thought. 
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren conclude that when consciously deliberating “it may feel as if one is 
processing information with the goal of making a decision,” when one is really pursuing “the 
goal of confirming an expectancy” (p. 98). Conversely, UTT surmises that unconscious thought 
slowly gathers large amounts of information aschematically, producing a more organized, 
polarized picture of the problem or object of interest.  
Any decision consists of a number of considerations. Some advantages are very big, 
while others may be virtually inconsequential. Individuals must determine which aspects of a 
decision are worth considering, and how much weight each should carry. According to the 
weighting principle, conscious thought can accomplish this as long as there are a limited number 
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of traits for each option and objective means by which to compare alternatives (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006). When outcomes of decisions, however, are subjective, such as aesthetics 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), affiliation (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Experiment 3) or satisfaction 
(Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006), conscious deliberation about decisions has been found to 
decrease decisional consistency and accuracy. This view of unconscious thought is largely 
consistent with System 2 in Kahneman‟s (2003) Theory of Bounded Rationality, the experiential 
system in Epstein‟s (1994) Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory, and gist knowledge in Reyna & 
Brainerd‟s (1995) Fuzzy Trace Theory. 
 Finally, a key feature of the conscious thought system is that it can form, and then follow, 
discrete, simple rules. This is known as the rule principle, and it precludes possible options by 
setting definitive, objectively determined rules, then eliminating options that do not conform to 
this rule. This principle is similar to Tversky‟s (1972) Theory of Elimination by Aspects, a 
heuristics-based means by which individuals reduce an overwhelming amount of choices to a 
more manageable number. The weighting and rule principles may be demonstrated by example:  
While selecting an apartment in which to live, one may entertain and weigh many salient 
attributes before making a decision. There may be one apartment that is objectively best based on 
these data. However, it is also possible that this apartment has one characteristic that precludes it 
from consideration; for instance, cost. The conscious thought system can quickly and efficiently 
veto this choice based on a single construct, despite the other desirable characteristics 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004). In this way, the conscious system has created a rule, and then followed it. 
There is no indication that the unconscious system is capable of this ability (Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006).  
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 A review of the literature reveals a general consensus regarding the existence of two 
systems that fluidly exchange information, share responsibilities, and often have discrepant goals 
(Evans, 2008; Wilson, 2002). Different theorists construe their terms and definitions somewhat 
differently, but a general picture has emerged of the differences between the two processes.  
The conscious system is limited, but has the ability to deal in abstraction. This system is 
flexible, but occasionally wanton and mercurial, easily fooled by spurious information or 
overwhelmed by stimulus-rich environments. The nonconscious system is not limited by 
capacity or language – it relies on gist, image, and emotion. This system supplies the building 
blocks used to construct our mental worlds. Unless discussing specific theoretical findings, 
conscious-rational will denote the former where possible, but conscious and rational are both 
theory-specific terms referencing this concept. Similarly, unconscious-intuitive will refer to the 
latter, but unconscious, nonconscious, and intuitive may also be used.   
Manipulating the Two Systems 
 If dual-processing theories are accurate, it should be possible to design methods capable 
of reliably manipulating the effects of each. Researchers have created such methods, which 
usually involve accentuating, bypassing or occupying one system in order to examine the other. 
 Examining the role of the conscious thought system is straightforward. This system is 
linguistic and reportable. Accentuated use of the rational system can be induced by asking an 
individual to actively contemplate their choices (Wilson, 2002). A more potent intervention, 
however, is achieved by asking individuals to create a list of positive and negative attributes 
based on the tasks or objects they are to decide between (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; 
Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Pinning down the unconscious, however, has proved a more difficult 
task, as it is, by definition, impossible to access through self-report. Research in social, cognitive, 
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and consumer psychology has accomplished this by adopting one of two methodological 
strategies: steamrolling or bypassing the conscious system, leaving the nonconscious system 
effectively in the “driver‟s seat.”  
Overwhelming the Conscious-Rational System. It is possible to overwhelm the 
conscious system by forcing participants to engage in an ongoing cognitive chore, called a 
cognitive load (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Cognitive loads may take a number of forms, but the 
simplest do nothing more than introduce as many pieces of information as the participant‟s 
working memory can hold while simultaneously asking them to make a decision. For instance, a 
cognitive load has been reliably achieved by asking participants to rehearse a seven-digit number 
(e.g., Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999), while choosing between competing options. Seven pieces of 
information is the approximate limit to the cognitive system, so when loaded to this point, it 
leaves only the unconscious system available to gather and use data (Miller, 1956). Unconscious 
Thought Theory researchers often present a stimulus then ask participants to engage in a written 
task, such as anagram puzzles (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006) so participants may engage 
in unconscious thought but not conscious deliberation. 
An example of a more potent cognitive load is the n-back task in which individuals hear a 
string of single-digit numbers. After each digit they are asked to reply with a verbal “yes” or 
“no” depending on if the number n places back in the sequence matches the number they have 
just heard. For instance, the participants might engage in a 2-back task, so they must correctly 
determine if the stimulus number is the same as the number two digits previously presented in 
the series. This task has been shown to adequately disrupt executive functions and maximize the 
capacity of one‟s working memory (Jonides et al., 1997). At a rate of one stimulus number per 
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second, the 2-back test has been successfully used as a conscious distracter to induce decisions 
under unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis, 2004). 
Bypassing the Conscious-Rational System. The conscious system can be circumvented 
through either immediate judgments or implicit associations. Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 
(1998) developed the Implicit Association Test (IAT), a computer-based assessment of 
nonconscious attitudes. This method has been shown to be a reliable gauge of the intuitive 
system and produces results with external validity, most famously in the area of racial 
stereotyping (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). Recently, a new computer-based test of implicit 
attitudes, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) has been developed based on 
Relational Frame Theory (Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, & Barnes-Holmes, 2009). Although this 
measure operates under different assumptions than the IAT, it functions in largely the same way. 
Both methods measure response times to paired stimuli that either conform to or are dissonant 
with their explicit beliefs. Subtle differences in response times, measured in milliseconds, are not 
under conscious control, but provide insight into implicit attitudes that have been shown to be 
predictive of behavior.  
Others have attempted to bypass the rational system by taking advantage of the 
discrepancy in decision speed between the two processes. The nonconscious, intuitive system 
recognizes patterns and comes to quick conclusions (according to most theories), while the 
conscious, rational system must deliberate. By forcing a quick decision, the rational system does 
not have time to form a hypothesis and buttress it. Information from the self-evident intuitive 
system, then, is the only basis upon which to make a choice (Epstein, 1994). This method has 
been used in a variety of experimental conditions to produce reliable effects on outcome 
variables (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988; Wilson et al., 
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1993). In direct comparisons of intuitive and rational decisions, researchers often hyperactivate 
the rational system in one condition, while attempting to bypass or incapacitate it in the intuitive 
choice condition (e.g., Wilson et al., 1993). After doing so, researchers are able to disentangle 
the abilities and weaknesses of each system. Employing different forms of these procedures, both 
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006), and Levine, Halberstadt, and Goldstone (1996) have found 
that judgments and predictions made under intuitive conditions are more consistent, per test-
retest reliability, than those made under rational conditions.  
 In summary, many researchers (e.g., Epstein, 2003; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Wilson, 
2002) have created compelling theories that include two distinct, independent but interacting 
systems of information processing. One is conscious-rational, the other unconscious-intuitive. 
Based on these theories, researchers have successfully designed conditions under which the 
effects of one system can be assessed with minimal interference from the other (see Evans, 2008 
for a summary).  
Dueling Processes: Dual-process Models Applied to Decision-Making  
Initially, researchers considered the unconscious to be nothing more than a repository for 
automatic processes – those skills that have been “overlearned” to the point that they occur with 
conscious initiation. Such automatic processes are usually equated with simple, rigid, 
perfunctory tasks, such as repetitive assembly line work. Only these tasks were thought to be 
under the purview of the unconscious (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). It was the conscious 
process that was assumed to be flexible, adaptive, and capable of accurate decision-making and 
problem-solving. Recent findings, however, have challenged this assumption. Although 
automaticity does account for nonconscious behavior during many mundane repetitive tasks, it 
does not account for higher level cognitive functions, in which the nonconscious apparatus 
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serves as a problem-solver and goal-setter. Such nonconscious operations often conflict with 
consciously reasoned motivations (Sloman, 2002). Bargh (2006) noted that, surprisingly, it was 
the nonconscious system - not the conscious system - that seemed to “operate flexibly and adapt 
to and overcome obstacles,” creating a “paradox raised by the priming and automaticity 
research” (p.149).   
 The relationship between these two systems is highly complex and covert. There is more 
to each of us than we know, as the unconscious-intuitive system exists beyond our awareness. It 
is vital to understand the interaction between the actors appearing on the stage of consciousness 
and those concealed forces that produce them. If the goal of psychological interventions is to 
allow clients to move through the world in a more adaptive manner, it is necessary to determine 
how these processes inform our decisions and behaviors.  
 Every decision, career-related or otherwise, can be divided into two categories based on 
the nature of the feedback received regarding those decisions. Some decisions are amenable to 
quantifiable measures of outcome, while others must rely on covert, internal experiences 
(Schwartz, 2004). For instance, in vocational psychology, objective outcomes of a career related 
decision are salary and tenure, as different jobs can be directly and specifically compared based 
on what they pay and how long an individual stays in that position (e.g., Super & Knasel, 1981). 
Satisfaction, on the other hand, is a common subjective career related outcome, and must be 
based on self-report (Iyengar et al., 2006). Researchers in a diverse array of fields, including 
marketing (Lindstrom, 2010), medicine (Reyna, 2008), aviation (Lehrer, 2009), ethics (Hauser, 
2006), and economics (Ariely, 2008), have produced a large literature base analyzing decision 
outcomes. Previously, these fields labored under the Standard Social Science assumption that 
human decision-making is guided by Rational Choice Theory, the best possible way for people 
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to approach decisions (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Gergrinzer, 2007; Reyna & Brainerd, 
1995).  Recently, however, a number of studies indicate that nonconscious processes and 
intuitive information are integral to optimal decision-making strategies.  
Computing Optimal Pathways: Decisions with Objective Outcomes. The 
Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) is an attempt to place the revised view of the unconscious 
within the broader decision-making literature (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). Under this 
paradigm, both conscious thought (CT) and unconscious thought (UT) systems require time to 
calculate and perform logical procedures in order to solve problems. As previously discussed, 
each system has its own attributes and is therefore advantageous in certain situations. UTT 
theorists have used cognitive load techniques to pit the two processes against one another.  
Concepts, problems, choices and other general thoughts can move between the conscious 
and unconscious systems with the removal or application of attention (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006). UTT stipulates that individuals are always thinking unconsciously, performing 
calculations outside of conscious awareness. Given time and certain circumstances, unconscious 
thought may produce superior choices than those produced by the conscious application of 
attention (i.e., actively thinking about the problem). The principles of UTT create a number of 
empirically testable hypotheses. Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) describe one such hypothesis as the 
“deliberation-without-attention effect” (p. 1005). The deliberation-without-attention effect 
predicts, counterintuitively, simple choices will be best handled by the rule-effective, limited 
capacity conscious thought process. Highly complex decisions, on the other hand, require the 
high capacity, bottom-up, evenly weighted characteristics indicative of the unconscious process.  
As a demonstration, Dijksterhuis (2004) asked individuals to choose one of four 
apartments based on 12 characteristics for each. One apartment was made to be attractive, with 
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75% of the attributes positive; another was made to be less appealing, with 25% of the attributes 
positive; the remaining two were average, with the same amount of positive and negative 
attributes. The 48 total pieces of information - far more than the working memory can handle - 
were given to each person.  
Participants in the conscious thought condition were asked to think about the apartments 
for three minutes and then asked for their preferences. Others engaged in a distracter task, 
designed to facilitate nonconscious thought for the apartment task, for the same three minutes. 
As predicted by UTT, those who engaged in nonconscious thought had more accurate attitudes 
about each apartment and made better decisions than did the conscious deliberators. Furthermore, 
those who were asked to choose immediately picked more poorly than did either of the thought 
groups (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Experiments 1 and 2).  
 In a further test of this effect, Dijksterhuis (2004) asked a number of potential consumers 
to choose between four items based on a number of their attributes. Some items had very few 
attributes, while others had many (e.g., oven mitts were described with four aspects, while 
computers were described with twelve). In each item set, one product was given more positive 
attributes than the others, making it the objectively “best” choice. Dijksterhuis found that choice 
quality was a function of two factors: the number of salient attributes and the amount of time 
spent in nonconscious versus conscious thought before the purchase. For simple choices, such as 
choosing the best oven mitt, conscious deliberation resulted in a better objective decision. For 
extremely complex decisions, such as the computer, increased nonconscious thought time 
predicted objective measures of choice quality.  
Later experiments not only replicated this principle, but extended its generalizability 
beyond the laboratory. In a study by Dijksterhuis, Bos, van der Leij, and van Baaren (2009), 
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participants were asked to pick the winners of a series of soccer matches in one of three 
conditions: immediately after being presented with the teams playing (no-thought condition), 
after a period of conscious deliberation (CT condition), or after a period of unconscious 
deliberation (UT condition). Participants were divided into experts, who were very 
knowledgeable about the soccer league and the teams, and novices, who knew little more than 
what would be required to make an educated guess. Experts did perform better than novices 
overall, however, their accuracy was highest in the UT condition. In order for their vast body of 
knowledge to come into play, experts needed time to unconsciously apply and weigh all of the 
aspects of the situation. In the no-thought condition they did not have this time. In the CT 
condition, their limited, biased, and distractible conscious thought processes interfered with this 
process, resulting in poorer choices than either of the other two groups.   
Conscious deliberation works very well for simple tasks involving a small amount of 
information. One can weigh a few attributes efficiently while applying rules and heuristics 
appropriately. Unconscious deliberation is a suboptimal (but still adequate) decision strategy 
when the task is simple. When tasks are complex, unconscious deliberation will produce the 
same suboptimal (but adequate) decision; that is, unconscious deliberation is a consistently fair 
decision-making strategy, while conscious deliberation is only good under very simple 
conditions. 
These findings align with other programs of research. Interestingly, a large body of 
research in the field of educational psychology has repeatedly shown that students who “go with 
their first instincts” on test answers err more often than students who go back and change their 
answers (Hallinan, 2009). A possible explanation for this is that students need more time to bring 
a large array of knowledge to bear on the task demands of exam questions. The students 
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consciously select an answer, but their unconscious systems continue to integrate knowledge. 
That is, the unconscious thought mechanism detects a problem and works on an answer despite 
the fact that the conscious system has moved on to the next question.  
Studies supporting Fuzzy Trace Theory have found that expert medical diagnosticians are 
more accurate when generating gist-level intuitions about the nature of client issues, than when 
they attempt to utilize specific textbook knowledge (Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). Reyna (2008) 
advocates giving doctors and public consumers of health information fewer specific details, 
because they are less likely to a) become distracted by irrelevant information, b) become 
overwhelmed by attempting to consciously memorize information, or c) draw faulty inferences 
when there are fewer specifics to process. No person can consciously cull, weigh, and synthesize 
abundant information without error. Novice doctors and the lay public errantly attempt to do so. 
Experts, either in soccer or diagnostics, rely on intuitive, gist-level representations to circumvent 
this problem and synthesize large knowledge bases with specific task-relevant data. 
Research in high-stakes expert decision-making outside the laboratory has resulted in the 
Naturalistic Decision Making Approach (Klein, 2003; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). 
Similar to the expert diagnosticians and soccer gamblers, experts from a variety of fields were 
found to generate predictions and solutions without consciously examining all of their options 
(Klein, 2003). Complex decisions under high pressure circumstances and in highly uncertain 
environments were made without conscious awareness of decision-making process of the decider. 
Based on this information, Klein (1993) created a “recognition-primed decision (RPD) model of 
rapid decision making” (p. 138). This model stipulates that deciders integrate vast numbers of 
discrete environmental cues into a single diffuse, nonspecific appraisal of the situation. 
Nonconscious mental simulations are then produced based on working mental models that have 
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been previously established through similar experiences. The entire process functions without 
conscious control. The results of these simulations (i.e., predictions) activate particular action 
scripts. According to RPD, effective decisions are not the result of the conscious comparison of 
competing options. They occur when intuitions are well informed and unhindered by rational 
analysis.  
There are a plethora of studies supporting general RPD hypotheses. Approximately 80 
percent of the decisions made by firefighter commanders were based solely or primarily on 
intuitive information (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). Army officers based 
judgments on intuition in 96 percent of their decisions (Klein, 1989). Naval commanders relied 
on intuition 95 percent of the time (Kaempf, Klein, Thordsen, & Wolf, 1996). Over 90 percent of 
the decisions made by oil platform managers were intuitive (Flin, Slaven, & Stewart, 1996). In 
each of these cases experts who were well regarded for their decision-making abilities made only 
a fraction of their decisions based on a rational, analytical comparison of options. Generally, the 
best decisions seemed to arrive inexplicably, without conscious deliberation or explicit 
calculation. Experienced firefighters, for instance, make judgments based on perceived risk, but 
even upon review of the precipitating clues, they were unable to distinguish the factors leading to 
this decision (Klein et al., 1986). Vast resources, including entire courses of research, have been 
used to determine how individuals were able to come to certain conclusions (Klein, 2000). These 
examinations are necessary because even when individuals made the “right” choice, they were 
unable to report why they did so.  
The ability to discern a pattern of stimuli and act in accordance with one‟s best interest is 
considered implicit learning (Price & Norman, 2008). Like the participants in Klein‟s expertise 
studies (see Klein, 2003 for a summary), individuals may often be able to act advantageously 
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without the ability to consciously understand and relate the knowledge upon which they are 
acting. Although Klein‟s research is focused on decisions made in naturalistic contexts, a number 
of laboratory experiments demonstrate this effect in well-controlled settings.  
Bechara, Damasio, Tranell, and Damasio (1997) provided evidence that intentional 
strategies are put into effect long before there is conscious awareness of that strategy. In a 
gambling task, individuals were monitored for skin-conductance reactions (SCRs) while being 
asked to pull cards from one of four decks. An SCR is one physiological indicator of the human 
stress response. Each card indicated the win or loss of a certain amount, and the individuals were 
monitored for stress responses as they chose from the different decks. Unbeknownst to the 
participants, two of the decks resulted in large gains and losses card-by-card, but ultimately 
resulted in overall losses. The other two decks had smaller gains and smaller losses card-by-card, 
but resulted in overall gains. After pulling just ten cards (on average) individuals‟ SCRs 
indicated greater physiological anxiety when pulling from the high-risk decks. This anxiety 
translated into significantly greater use of the safer decks. At this point, however, participants did 
not consciously indicate any preference between the decks, nor did they note any strategy for 
their decisions. It was not until participants drew about fifty cards (on average) that they began to 
report a conscious preference for the safe decks. At this point, however, they still did not know 
precisely why, instead indicating they “liked” and “disliked” certain decks for unknown reasons 
(p. 1244). It was only when the participants had drawn eighty cards were they able to articulate 
their reasons behind their decisions. Thus, the participants began acting on information after ten 
cards, but became aware of their emotional response to the decks after fifty cards, and could only 
accurately describe their decisions after eighty cards. Individuals were analyzing and utilizing 
information before they were aware they were doing so.  
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In another experiment, participants were placed in front of a computer touch screen 
divided into quadrants (Lewicki, Hill, & Bizot, 1988). They were instructed to touch the 
quadrant in which an “X” appeared as quickly as possible. After they touched the stimulus their 
reaction time was displayed on the screen. Unbeknownst to the participants, the computer was 
programmed to run a complicated 12-step algorithm to determine where the next “X” would 
appear. After a number of trials, average response times began to creep down. Participants 
reported that this was because practice effects had increased their performance. After more trials, 
the computer began to actually run random patterns. Participants‟ performance slowed to the 
pace they were responding at the beginning of the trial. Participants were again at a loss, and 
attributed their slowed times to “losing the touch.”  
Participants had learned the complex algorithm controlling the placement of the stimulus, 
but were never consciously aware of it. They did not know they had adopted an adaptive strategy. 
When lacking insight into their actual intentions and strategies, they were forced to invent a 
plausible story to explain the experience. The “practice effects” hypothesis the participants 
provided seemed entirely plausible and aligned with their previous experience with the benefits 
of practicing in general. This story was consciously adopted and precluded the report of the 
actual working of nonconscious processes at play. Price and Norman (2008) stripped the 
participants of this story, by asking participants to anticipate the location of the next stimulus. 
Participants guessed the correct location at significantly higher rates than would be expected by 
chance alone, but were left at a loss as to how they were able to perform so well. Participants 
were able to report accurate intuitive knowledge, but were clueless as to the processes creating a 
“gut feeling.”  
This principle is further evidenced by participants‟ uncanny ability to judge the 
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desirability of stocks (Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gutig, 2001). Five stocks, each given fake, 
affectively neutral names, were presented fifteen different times on a crawler placed on the 
bottom of a television screen that played commercials. Each presentation was paired with a loss 
or gain associated with the particular stock. At the end of the “day,” the stocks ended with 300, 
400, 500, 600, or 700 point increases. The participants were wildly inaccurate when they 
attempted to estimate the actual quantitative value gained by each stock, but they showed a 
remarkable sensitivity to the differences between the objective stock choices. In fact, diffuse, 
affectively charged judgments of how “good” or “bad” the stock companies were reflected a far 
more accurate appraisal of a stock‟s relative worth than their quantitative value guesses.  
The researchers behind this experiment, Betsch et al. (2001), have termed this 
nonconscious ability the “value account” (p. 242). This metaphorical repository stores the 
intensities of positive and negative information related to any concept and integrates the 
information to create a fuzzy, gist-level intuition that helps guide our decisions. Although it may 
be especially true for experts, utilizing the gist-knowledge available in the nonconscious system 
was far more advantageous when integrating with large amounts of complex data.  
 Of course, in each of the previous examples, the ideal strategy would be to amass data, 
research and compare options, or just calculate the correct answer. Anyone with basic math skills, 
the time, and a pencil and paper could determine which option is the objectively best apartment, 
stock, or card deck. This strategy would be exact and alleviate all uncertainty, but the conditions 
of the experiments precluded this possibility. Experimenters forced uncertainty into the equation. 
Critics (e.g., Herbert, 2010) have argued that this defeats the purpose of these studies and 
violates the very principle - optimal decision-making - that is attempted to be studied. The 
creation of uncertainty, however, simulates the real-life situations, like the firefighters, pilots, 
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and military commanders in Klein‟s (2009) Naturalistic Decision Making research. Most 
decisions occur under highly uncertain, highly unstable circumstances. Kahneman and Klein 
(2009) have called situations in which the causal relationships between variables are highly 
unstable “low-validity environments” (p. 524). In such contexts, complex algorithms that rely on 
huge databases of information and conduct sophisticated equations work better than human 
experts. The rational system is an analog for these algorithmic strategies, as it symbolizes, 
integrates and applies rules in the same way computers do (Hastie & Dawes, 2010). Acting like a 
computer, however, requires a great amount of resources. If the decision-maker is precluded 
from computation because of time, emotion, confusion, lack of skill, chaos, or environmental 
complexity, it is perhaps best not to emulate a reductionistic, computational, “computer-like” 
strategy. Human deciders are not computers, and we often err when we act as if we are.  
Theory supports the existence of two separate and interacting information systems. These 
systems may be experimentally disentangled. When this occurs, decision-makers often make 
more adaptive objective decisions when relying on nonconscious, intuitive processes.   
Calculating the Inexpressible: Decisions with Subjective Outcomes. In contrast to 
decisions regarding objective measures of success, decisions with subjective outcomes require a 
large amount of idiosyncratic, self-referent knowledge. The cognitive and social psychology 
literature is replete with studies citing the deficiencies of the conscious thought apparatus in this 
domain (see Gilbert, 2006; Wilson, 2002 for summaries); which can be divided into motivational 
and nonmotivational limits to self-knowledge (Wilson & Dunn, 2004). Recent empirical 
evidence indicates that suppression, intentional forgetting, and repression are all mechanisms 
that keep self-knowledge out of conscious awareness. Although these mechanisms limit 
conscious knowledge, the information upon which they act still exists in nonconscious form. 
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Inaccessible, suppressed, repressed, and (sometimes) intentionally forgotten information that has 
left conscious awareness “still exists in memory and continues to influence people‟s thoughts, 
feelings, or behavior” (Wilson & Dunn, 2004; p. 495). Even when highly motivated and 
psychologically well-prepared, however, there are limits to what we can know about ourselves 
(Wilson, 2002).   
Generally, individuals perform poorly when predicting exactly how they will feel under 
future conditions. Known as affective forecasting, research indicates that people make choices 
based on the anticipation of an emotional reward. Unfortunately, a sizeable gap often exists 
between one‟s expectation and one‟s actual affective response to the consequence of a choice 
(Patrick, Macinnis, & Park, 2007).  
This phenomenon was investigated by Kurtz, Wilson, and Gilbert (2007). When 
individuals are given the choice between receiving two pieces of candy now, and one piece of 
candy at some indefinite time in the future, participants usually choose the former. The two-
prizes-now option is the logical and economical choice. It did not produce, however, the 
affective result that the participants expected. Conscious deliberation led them to believe they 
would be happier if they took two prizes now, when, in fact, the anticipation and surprise of a 
future reward resulted in more positive mood states for longer amounts of time. This has been 
dubbed “positive uncertainty” (p. 797) by researchers.  
When we look into the future we make predictable, consistent mistakes. As individuals 
assume a hyper-rational approach to decision-making, they often decompose their options, by 
making a mental or physical list of pros and cons. Instead of decreasing the amount of 
forecasting mistakes, a reductionistic approach actually compounds the chances of making them 
(Gilbert, Gill & Wilson, 2002). Rationally breaking down a decision into components does 
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nothing more than increase the chance for mistakes in affective forecasting, as prospecting about 
the effects of each sub-item is another opportunity for error (Gilbert et al., 2002). 
Wilson and Schooler (1991; Experiment 1) created an experiment to demonstrate this 
effect. College students were recruited to taste and rate five strawberry jams. The jams were 
selected from a recent edition of consumer reports, in which experts had rated 45 popular brands 
of jam. Experts used 16 sensory characteristics as the basis for judgment of jam quality. The 1
st
, 
11
th
, 24
th
, 32
nd
, and 44
th
 jams were selected for the study. Given the five jams and left to their 
own particular tastes, the student rankings of jams “corresponded well” to expert ratings (p. 185). 
When asked to analyze the reasons why they liked certain jams along the 16 sensory dimensions 
used by the experts, student evaluations deviated significantly from expert judgments. Using 
non-analytical, intuitive data resulted in a holistic appraisal that incorporated unbiased personal 
preferences.  
The student participants in the jam study have a large history of eating foods and a large 
body of experiential knowledge as to their likes and dislikes. They are experts in themselves, but 
not in tasting nuanced flavors and textures in jam. Wilson and Schooler (1991) concluded that 
conscious analysis led students away from deciding based on experiential expertise and toward 
“decisions they will eventually regret” (p. 185). Deliberate efforts to introspect resulted in poor 
predictions about how they will feel about their choices in the future. This conclusion has since 
been supported by Klein‟s (2003; 2009) research on the intersection of intuition and expertise.  
Three constructs have been identified as impediments to the ability to successfully 
forecast emotions in a conscious, intentional manner. First, in what is known as the durability 
bias, individuals overestimate the lasting effects of a positive or negative event. Participants, 
when asked to predict how long they will be happy or sad after an emotional event (e.g., the end 
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of a romantic relationship), consistently overestimated the amount of time it would take them to 
return to their previous levels of satisfaction (Gilbert et al., 1998). Researchers showed that this 
effect was negated when individuals were asked to focus on aspects of their lives that would not 
change after the event in question (Wilson, Wheatley, Myers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). One 
reason people were inaccurate in their affective forecasts was because they were focused on a 
single piece of information rather than the many variables that would affect their future state. A 
conscious appraisal of all potential variables that will impact one‟s future mood is not possible, 
given the limited capacity of the conscious-rational system.  
The second is that individuals have difficulty separating reality from their conscious 
perception of reality. Gilbert (2006) makes the following metaphor: our conscious lives are lived 
inside what amounts to a movie that is seamlessly and effortlessly (at a conscious level) 
generated and edited by the brain. Nonconscious processes work to fill in the gaps, and are so 
good at doing so that the rational system is not aware it has even been done at all. We therefore 
act as if it has not. This concept is central to understanding how individuals make sense of 
themselves and their opportunities.  
The recognition that humans process information automatically, nonconsciously, and 
effortlessly dates back to the origins of psychology. Gestalt psychologists emphasized the self-
organizing principles of the mind. Instead of perceiving a jumble of simple lines, curves and 
shades, which constitute visual units that comprise images, the raw data is automatically 
consolidated into a finished product: a single object against a background (Friedenberg & 
Silverman, 2012). To do this, the brain reduces or adds information according to certain 
principles. Gestalt theorists invented or co-opted a variety of visual illusions that demonstrate the 
principle, such as the Necker Cube and the Dot Lattice. Humans sense a world of innumerous 
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lines, points, movements, shades, colors, and textures. Gestaltists were the first to empirically 
demonstrate that humans do not (and cannot) look into the world and see these phenomena. 
Brains take the liberty to manufacture the objects by which we are surrounded from these raw 
materials (Wegner, 2002). As Eagleman (2011) states, “visual illusions reveal a deeper concept: 
that our thoughts are generated by machinery to which we have no direct access” (p. 194).  
When humans interact with the world, we do not apprehend the world as it is, but as it is 
perceived; after the information has been computed sub rosa and made meaningful by the brain 
(Hastie & Dawes, 2010). The sub-conscious construction of meaning is a supposition at the heart 
of most psychotherapeutic philosophies (Eagleman, 2011) and current neuroscientific notions of 
information processing (Norretranders, 1999). At the level of conscious awareness, humans only 
have access to the symbols (i.e., gestalts) that compose their world. In Gilbert‟s (2006) 
terminology, the events we “see” unfold in the theater of the mind should not be confused with 
the actual events, as we are not watching reality, but our brain‟s symbolized representation of 
reality. The process of symbolization is influenced by evolutionary, historical, cultural, and 
contextual factors that themselves lie beyond awareness. The fluidity and facility with which our 
reality is constructed seduces people into believing they live in a seamless, predictable world – 
one in which they can predict future emotional states based on a careful review of their 
experience. This particular point is of critical importance and will be revisited when discussing 
Wilson‟s (2002) theory regarding the adaptive unconscious.  
The third impediment to accurate affective forecasting is a simple case of misattribution 
(Gilbert, 2006). When we engage in future forecasting, we cannot be certain that our emotions 
are a product of our imagined forecast, or if they are a product of our here-and-now experiences, 
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such as hunger or fatigue. In such cases, ambiguous attributions can easily be accidently 
misinterpreted or worse yet, actively misinterpreted to confirm previously held beliefs.  
Gilbert, Gill, and Wilson (2002) found that consumers use current emotional reactions to 
products in order to estimate the future consequences of purchases. When doing so, decisions are 
made based on the transient feelings of which we are currently aware. Immediate psychological 
states seem to be integral to our affective forecasts, and therefore our decisions.  The authors 
conclude that “this tendency will bias forecasts in some instances, but surprisingly, it may debias 
them in others” (p. 441). For instance, becoming hungry when coming across a certain candy bar 
is likely to be an excellent indicator of future reactions. Shopping while in a general state of 
hunger, however, is likely to yield more inaccurate forecasts about one‟s future enjoyment of 
products. A problem arises for consumers when attempting to make the appropriate attribution 
for their current state of arousal. Consumers cannot disambiguate pre-existing emotional states, 
and those elicited by thoughts of the stimulus, creating a confusing decisional landscape.  
Emotional misattribution was also investigated by Dutton and Aron (1974). The 
researchers had an attractive female researcher give male hikers her phone number either before 
or after they had crossed a swaying, rickety footbridge. Twice as many participants (60% vs. 
30%) called the researcher when they interacted with her after crossing the footbridge. The 
authors concluded that the participants had mistakenly confused the anxious arousal that resulted 
from crossing a dangerous ravine with sexual arousal produced by the presence of the researcher. 
The participants‟ expectations about how they would feel about the researcher were influenced 
by a totally irrelevant stimulus.  
These and other problems are rampant in human goal setting (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999) and prediction (e.g., Gilbert & Wilson, 2000). Such errors are a function of the limited and 
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schematic nature - a proclivity to seek evidence for preconceived notions - of conscious thought. 
In contrast, unconscious thought works aschematically. Betsch et al.‟s (2001), concept of the 
unconscious “value account” (noted previously) creates a nebulous but powerful opinion that 
serves to direct our preferences. By storing the valence and strength of relevant information, the 
unconscious can slowly absorb large amounts of data, creating an unbiased opinion (Dijksterhuis 
& Nordgren, 2006). 
 The inability to appropriately weigh information is perhaps the most flagrant threat to 
subjective decision-making, and the human consciousness is very poor at doing this accurately 
(Price & Norman, 2008) or consistently (Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2006 as cited in Dijksterhuis 
& Nordgren, 2006). This principle was demonstrated in a study by Wilson et al. (1993). 
Researchers asked college students to choose one of two posters to keep. Some students were 
asked to evaluate and choose the posters immediately, with little time to deliberate. Others were 
given time to think about their choice, and asked to deliberate about why they would prefer one 
over the other. Three weeks after receiving the poster, participants were contacted and asked how 
satisfied they were with their choice. Those that had chosen immediately were significantly 
happier with their choice than their deliberative counterparts.  
 This methodology was replicated and extended by Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006). 
Commensurate with Unconscious Thought Theory, participants were placed in one of three 
groups: an immediate choice condition, a conscious thought condition, and an unconscious 
thought condition. The immediate choice and conscious thought conditions were similar to those 
induced by Wilson et al. (1993). In the unconscious thought condition, participants were shown 
the posters, and engaged in an anagram distracter task for 450 seconds to induce cognitive load 
and preclude conscious deliberation while allowing time for unconscious thought. Again, 
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participants were contacted two weeks later and asked a number of questions related to their 
satisfaction with their choice. Replicating the results from Wilson et al. (1993), participants in 
the immediate choice condition were more satisfied with their choice, had less regret about not 
selecting the other posters, and stated they would require significantly more money to sell their 
poster than the participants in the conscious thought condition. Furthermore, participants who 
engaged in unconscious thought before their decision outperformed both groups in all measures 
of satisfaction. Thinking unconsciously and making an intuitive choice resulted in a more 
advantageous decision. 
 Nonconscious thought has been shown to produce better predictions of one‟s future 
affective state. The unconscious can remain relatively unbiased because it assigns relatively 
“natural” weights to various attributes of a decision (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; p. 99). 
Preliminary evidence indicates that idiosyncratic preferences adaptively influence unconscious 
weighting. Importantly, the nonconscious ability to apply personal and cultural inclinations can 
affect individual impressions; the optimal choice for one may be terrible for another. Like the 
poster study, individuals who were asked to choose roommates based on a list of characteristics 
were more likely to select a roommate that conforms to their personal, idiosyncratic values if 
they make intuitive decisions after unconscious thought than when they used conscious thought 
to come to a rational decision (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Experiment 3).  
Furthermore, UTT‟s deliberation-without-attention effect has been shown to produce 
objectively better outcomes when deciding between competing consumer goods (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2005). But since there are no objectively “best” answers for consumers in 
the marketplace, this study was replicated using consumer satisfaction as an outcome variable. 
Dijksterhuis (2004) found that satisfaction with purchased items was a function of two factors: 
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the number of salient attributes and the amount of time spent in nonconscious versus conscious 
thought before the purchase. For those items with only a small number of attributes, such as oven 
mitts, conscious thought time was more important than was nonconscious thought time. For 
extremely complex decisions with many salient attributes, such as choosing a computer or a car, 
increased nonconscious thought time predicted satisfaction. This indicates that, 
counterintuitively, decisions that necessitate the integration of a large amount of information 
should be made not after abundant conscious consideration, but after abundant nonconscious 
deliberation. 
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) admit that there is much yet to discover about the exact 
mechanisms of unconscious thought. For the present purposes, the most important aspect of UTT 
is that the unconscious thought system is like an “archeologist . . . uncovering values that are 
already there” (p. 97). Conscious thought, on the other hand, is often an exercise in rationalizing 
decisions that we believe we “should” want.  
Wilson (2002), called the intuitive system the “adaptive unconscious,” and constructed a 
theory that is congruent with the formulations of the conscious and nonconscious systems in 
dual-processing models presented previously. The nonconscious-intuitive system (System 1) 
utilizes images, emotions and idiosyncratic behaviors that occur outside the control of the 
conscious system. Given that this system uses self-referential emotions as a form of language, it 
is no wonder that it is more predictive of affective states. The “cold” cognitions and logic used 
by the rational-conscious system (System 2) have little bearing on affective states, and only 
through a convoluted neural system. Furthermore, Wilson asserts the myriad of little decisions 
and actions we make throughout the day – the ticks that make us seem nervous, the smile that 
makes us seem confident – are under the control of the nonconscious system. These minute, 
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nonconscious decisions make up the fabric of our daily lives, yet we are painfully unaware of 
them on a conscious level. 
For instance, people often have conflicting nonconscious and conscious concepts 
regarding the self. Studies indicate that more than half of surveyed college students were shy in 
childhood, but grew out of it before the age of 14. For many, however, their conscious self-story 
does not reflect this, and they still believe they are shy, even though others report that they are 
extraverted and outgoing (Melchior & Cheek, 1990). In such a case, an individual would not 
predict his/her behavior in a novel situation as well as a friend or stranger would. This is because 
most actions of the individual are not under their conscious control, but subject to one‟s 
unconscious personality. Wilson argues, however, that big choices, the ones in which we decide 
who to marry, where to live, what job to choose are all conscious choices and will result in 
choices that are less indicative of the adaptive unconscious and more closely related to one‟s 
identity, a socially constructed view of what we ought to do, think, and feel based on what we 
know about ourselves and causal relationships in the world. Of course, as noted above, we claim 
to know much more about ourselves than can actually be proven. 
As we look at ourselves and predict our future, we do so by constructing an internal 
representation of ourselves and our world, so called “mental models” (Klein, 2009; Hastie & 
Dawes, 2010). The symbolic version of “me” is an abstraction, a reduced version of what we are. 
We are not consciously aware of most of our internal processes and influences, so they remain 
unincorporated into the narrative, symbolic self. Conscious appraisals of ourselves and future 
forecasts rely less on our behaviors and personality, and more on how we have symbolized our 
world (Wilson, 2002). Mental representations of the self are like two-dimensional images of 
three-dimensional objects. Even if accurately represented, the image should not be confused with 
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the object. The symbolic “I” present in one‟s mental model of the world is a faint and often 
faulty representation of the “me” that exists in reality. Asking one to consciously forecast the 
future will result in a prediction based on redacted accounts and partial information. As 
previously noted, simply because an individual cannot report learning new information or 
enacting a particular strategy, it does not mean they have not. The reified “me” that exists here-
and-now has gleaned such information from direct experience – not from introspection.  
Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson (1999) implore decision-makers to trust their fund of 
experiential knowledge when committing to a course of action. Experience, they contend, simply 
is. Thoughts, however, are rationalizations vulnerable to a host of potentially crippling 
judgments and assumptions. The authors do not claim that thoughts are unimportant or 
epiphenomenal, but that they should be held lightly. To refer again to Gilbert‟s (2006) mental 
movie analogy, it is best for decision-makers to remain cognizant that their thoughts represent a 
biased and carefully edited version of reality.  
Wilson‟s (2002) assertions regarding the “adaptive unconscious” tie together much of 
what has been discussed thus far. There are two systems of information processing, and they can 
be manipulated. Depending on the situation, either the unconscious-intuitive or conscious-
rational system can make a better objective decision, but when it comes to subjective outcomes, 
the unconscious system is generally preferable. The implications for vocational psychology are 
vast. Under such a paradigm, it is entirely possible for individuals to engage in a task that they 
find incredibly interesting and personally satisfying - an experience that could launch them into a 
career in which they find joy and fulfillment - only to discount this experience if it does not 
conform to consciously held self-theories. Wilson notes:  
 
-45- 
 
"Surely, however, we do not want our conscious conceptions to get too out of 
whack [from our unconscious ones]. There are many times when we would be 
better off recognizing our limitations, abilities, and prospects. When choosing a 
career, for example, it would be to people's advantage to know whether their 
unconscious personalities were better suited for a life as a lawyer, salesperson, or 
circus performer" (p. 91).  
 Conscious introspection about our interests, preferences and personalities often 
does not result in accurate appraisals of ourselves and our options. The possibility that 
self-reported interests and desires are not trustworthy has been forwarded, and it has 
frightening implications for the field of vocational psychology (Krieshok, 1998).  
Decision-Making in Vocational Psychology: Anti-introspectivism and the Trilateral Model 
Making a career choice is a complex endeavor. It involves holistic, integrative thinking; 
an examination of the outer world of job markets, economies, scales of industry, as well as the 
inner world of needs, interests, desires, expectations, etc. This is exactly the kind of decision that, 
according to Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (Epstein, 1994), Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995), Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), and Wilson‟s 
(2002) formulation of the adaptive unconscious, should place a premium on information 
generated by the nonconscious thought apparatus.  
Though the particulars vary based on the theoretical approach, career counselors and their 
clients must attempt to assimilate massive amounts of information, and try to do so consciously. 
Holland‟s Theory of Vocational Personalities in Work Environment (1978), for instance, 
involves accurately assessing how an individual will function within an environment (Spokane & 
Cruza-Guet, 2005). The resulting instruments quantify several sub-constructs for both 
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individuals and occupations. Dozens of assessments have been created to identify traits (e.g., 
Holland, 1978), interests (see Hansen, 2005 for a summary), skills (e.g., Bolles, 2009), abilities 
(e.g., Krane & Tirre, 2006), and needs and values (e.g., Rounds & Armstrong, 2006) that are 
suspected to be pertinent to the person-environment interaction. One obvious problem is the 
inability for consciousness to keep up with the demands of this task. Another is that almost every 
available assessment used in career counseling uses self-report as the primary means of data 
collection. Under the traditional paradigm of career counseling, undergirded by Rational Choice 
Theory, such observations are not considered problematic (Barak, 2001). Many, however, have 
questioned that paradigm.  
Krieshok (1998) persuasively argued that these problems are directly applicable to career 
counseling, and therefore, an introspective effort toward career decision-making is theoretically 
problematic. Appropriately calling this the “Anti-Introspective Approach” (AI), Krieshok 
challenged the notion that decision-makers can successfully select and weigh salient self-
information. Available career counseling techniques are susceptible to the cognitive distortions 
and affective misforcasting discussed previously.  
Krieshok (1998) outlines a continuum upon which AI theories may be applied to career 
counseling. The strictest AI approach regards thoughts as epiphenomenal. Despite our subjective 
experience, conscious will has little or no bearing on our actions, so attempting to make career 
related decisions through introspection is futile. Under this view, introspective efforts result in 
nothing more than a plausible account of why one has acted the way one has, based on the most 
accessible (but not necessarily most important) self-knowledge. Decisions based on these 
verbalized narratives are likely to be built on faulty inferences. Career assessments, therefore, 
may reflect self-narratives that have little basis in reality or history. If strict-AI approaches are 
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correct, career counselors would be well-advised, Krieshok contends, to avoid interventions that 
require clients to explicitly introspect, quantify, and rank their preferences. The cognitive process 
underlying introspective tasks is more akin to self-fabrication than to self-exploration.  
Less radical AI approaches view accurate self-reflection as difficult, but not impossible to 
achieve (Krieshok, 1998). This view recalls Freud‟s famous iceberg metaphor: only a small 
amount of mental life resides above the waterline of consciousness. The underlying mass is not 
entirely inaccessible, but its discovery requires adventurous exploration and great effort. 
Disciplined inquiry through journaling, guided imagery, and psychotherapy can aid this endeavor. 
Engaging in these exercises can yield valuable information regarding personal values and life 
themes, as long as clients adopt a flexible and open approach to their previously held self-
narratives.  
Although AI approaches suggest accurate introspection is difficult, if not impossible, it 
does not mean that one must guess blindly when making decisions. Introspection, the 
observation of covert thoughts and feelings, is not the only evidence used by decision makers.  
Bem‟s (1972) Self-Perception theory is based on the proposition that “individuals come to 
„know‟ their own attitudes, emotions, and other emotional states partially by inferring them from 
their own overt behavior” (p. 2). Through a series of experiments, Bem supported the contention 
that people understand themselves not through direct introspection, but through a careful 
examination of their actions. Individuals often respond to the question “What do you like?” with 
an answer to “What do I usually do?” Although this may be valuable information, it is clear that 
the inferential leap between these two questions can be misleading, especially when attempting 
to predict the affective consequences of decisions.  
 
-48- 
 
Such inferences may be particularly hazardous, as they rely directly on memories of 
events, experiences, and emotions. Reports from memory are considered to be less of a 
recollection than a reconstruction (Hastie & Dawes, 2010). There is a robust cache of 
experimental and observational studies supporting the conclusion that explicit memories are 
highly biased, incredibly malleable, and definitively prejudiced. Reconstruction of past events is 
often influenced by a host of factors that are logically unrelated to the content of the memory 
itself, such as salient contextual attributes, emotional state, level of physiological arousal, social 
desirability, and expectations (both at the time of experience and at the time of recall). This 
literature has almost exclusively dealt with explicit, reportable memories, which are accessed, 
manipulated and brought to consciousness by the conscious-rational narrative system (i.e., 
System 2). Krieshok (1998) notes this connection, claiming “reconstructing reasons from 
available information is similar to the process of reconstruction that goes on when someone is 
asked to recall events from memory” (p. 218). It would be expected, then, that individuals 
effectively mis-remember experiences to be more consonant with their consciously held 
expectations of self and world. 
 Based on the AI literature, Krieshok (1998) challenged a number of assumptions held by 
the vocational psychology field at large. Conscious decisions likely have less influence on 
vocational behaviors than counselors and clients suspect. Career interventions that encourage 
clients to introspect can actually be misleading or otherwise harmful. Client self-report is 
important, but it is unlikely to be valid data on face value, and should be interpreted with caution 
and curiosity. Clinical assessments and personal judgments based on memories are shaky, at best. 
Regardless of the theoretical distinctions between AI approaches, how one structures the 
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decision-making process and relates to their self-knowledge will impact career decisions and 
vocational behaviors (Krieshok, 1998; 2001).  
Iyengar et al. (2006) conducted one study testing the outcome of different decision-
making strategies by directly linking intuitive and rational decision-making processes with career 
outcomes. Graduating high school seniors were given a variety of measures before beginning 
their job hunt. After securing jobs, participants were split into two groups based on how they 
decided which job to take. One group, “maximizers,” had a tendency to survey all the options 
and carefully weigh all the available information against their options. They relied on external, 
objective standards. The other, “satisficers,” however, looked at only a few options and 
considered only a few variables, and had a tendency to choose based on internal variables. The 
strategy employed by maximizers is analogous to hyper-activating the rational-conscious system. 
Their counterparts, the satisficers, utilize a strategy analogous to the intuitive-unconscious 
system. Students with maximizing tendencies were shown to do objectively better: they were 
earning 20% more than the satisficers. The satisficers, however, were significantly more satisfied 
with their job choice. In support of the literature previously discussed, the authors concluded the 
maximizers were “doing better but feeling worse” (p. 143).  
Perhaps the best way to create the optimal environment for career selection is to 
experientially engage in the possible occupations of interest (Krieshok, 2001). Experience in the 
world informs the nonconscious system, utilizing all 11 million bits per second of bandwidth 
capable of being processed by humans. Talking about the world and introspecting, as suggested 
by traditional career counseling, activates only the conscious thought system, with its 20 bits per 
second processing speed, limited capacity biases and miswanting. After a survey of the literature, 
much of which has been presented here, Krieshok and his colleagues (2009) determined that both 
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intuitive and rational processes are vital for adaptive career decision-making. Neither process, 
however, can help guide an individual in a vacuum. The researchers have termed meaningful 
occupational activities that fund both intuitive and rational knowledge bases as “occupational 
engagement” (p. 10).  
Occupational engagement gives experience primacy in the decision-making process. The 
best way to determine how one will feel about a certain job or activity is to actually do it (or get 
as close as possible to the experience of actually doing it). The Trilateral Model predicts that 
activities which promote greater interaction with the options of interest will lead to more optimal 
choices. Engagement is fundamentally about immersing oneself with the stimuli that accompany 
a decision. The best way to determine how you will feel about a certain job, major, or hobby is to 
truly “feel” it out, by developing gist-level affective responses to a vast array of contextual cues, 
job-relevant tasks, and environmental feedback. Consciously thinking about potential jobs is 
more engaging than not, but talking to those who have had those jobs is better. Looking up 
information about a job on the internet is more engaging than not, but shadowing someone with 
that job for a day is better.  
Engagement is theoretically defined as consisting of both enrichment and exploration. 
The concept of exploration was first defined by Super and Knasel (1981), as those behaviors that 
increase the amount of career-relevant information. Enrichment, by contrast, is a process-
oriented increase in self-awareness vis-à-vis the world of work. Exploration is a cyclical state 
behavior that is discretely absent or present given an individual‟s current activities and goals. 
Enrichment, however, is a constant pursuit that encapsulates both attitudes and behaviors. 
Krieshok et al. (2009) classify each of these in behavioral terms, emphasizing the active nature 
of engagement. 
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As we have seen, however, engagement may also be insufficient to overcome an 
incongruence between conscious and nonconscious systems. Experience certainly informs both 
rational and intuitive systems, but it is unlikely that they benefit equally. Based on the previous 
literature, there may be reason to suspect that engagement may differentially fund the two 
systems, affecting change in the experiential, subtle nonconscious system, but often without 
much impact on the rational system as self-narratives may be deeply entrenched.  
It is undoubted that the rational system can also be influenced, but, in accordance with 
theories mentioned previously, this is likely to occur under analytical and verbal conditions that 
supply evidence to buttress an opinion. Although the unconscious mechanism may lead to 
enjoyable opportunities if given the opportunity, the rational system may need some help 
adapting to these changes. Occupational identity change is likely to require active, on-line 
processing. Opportunities to analyze and process such events, construct and re-construct 
narratives, and discover evidence about oneself and the world of work do exist – in the form of 
career counseling. Thus, the best way to foster meaningful change would be to align the two 
systems. In this vein, Krieshok et al. (2009) stated that “we would do well to teach people to 
think and feel about experiential information in a more intentional way” (p. 11). Career 
counselors can provide a conduit for this intentionality.  
Interest Forecasting 
 This study introduces a new term, interest forecasting. Interest forecasts are a specific 
type of affective forecast; which are predictions about how different options will affect one‟s 
future emotional state. Specifically, interest forecasts are an answer to the question, “How 
interested will I find this experience?” Such predictions are common in everyday life, as they are 
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the basis upon which we select certain television programs, pick up certain magazines, or, in the 
case of college students, choose some classes over others.   
Although there is no precedent in the literature for this specific form of affective forecast, 
there is no reason to believe that interest forecasts would function any differently than the 
literature pertaining to satisfaction with consumer products (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), 
artistic aesthetics (Wilson et al., 1993), or taste (Wilson & Schooler, 1991). As discussed, the 
assessment and prediction of interests is vital to the field of vocational psychology, and the 
implicit goal of many of the most commonly used instruments in the field (Krieshok et al., 2011). 
Based on the extant decision-making literature reviewed previously, Krieshok (1998) and 
Krieshok et al. (2011) have challenged the hyper-rational approach to interest assessment and the 
validity of client self-report.  
A Short Story. A short story may exemplify the intersection of information-processing 
models and the assessment of interests. In a 1999 experiment by Shiv and Fedorikhin, 
participants were randomly placed into one of two conditions. One half was asked to remember a 
seven-digit number. The other half was asked to remember a two-digit number. The task required 
that they memorize the number, walk down the hallway into another room, and repeat it to a 
researcher. As the participants walked down the hallway, however, another member of the 
research team stopped them and told them that for participating in the survey they could have 
one of two snacks: a cup of fruit salad or a piece of chocolate cake.  
Of those that were asked to remember a two-digit number, 41% chose the cake. Of those 
that were asked to remember a seven-digit number, 63% chose the cake. When the seven-digit 
group was asked why they chose cake, they gave the answers one would expect: they just felt 
like some cake, or it looked too good to pass up. Not a single participant mentioned the seven 
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digit number they were asked to memorize a few moments earlier. This, despite the fact that 
memorizing the number obviously had something to do with their decision: the seven-digit group 
was more than 50% more likely to choose cake than their two-digit counterparts. 
The researchers concluded that those who had little to occupy their minds (i.e., a two-
digit number) had the cognitive resources available to make the prudent, logical choice. It may 
not have made the participant as happy as the cake, but their decision would have made their 
mothers happy. The fruit cup was the defensible, deliberate choice. This is the choice that they 
ought to want based on their consciously held narratives about the kind of person they were. The 
fruit cup represented the option they want. 
Those who were busy rehearsing a seven-digit number were tapped out of cognitive 
resources. The cake was a choice unmitigated by reason. They were unable to consciously assess 
the options vis-à-vis their self-imposed rules of behavior. The choice was likely not as defensible 
as the fruit cup, but it certainly made their taste buds happy. The cake represented the option they 
knew they would like.  
This begs the question, when making interest-salient decisions (such as educational and 
occupational opportunities) are individuals better served by using strategies that point them 
toward “fruit cups” activities? Or, is it more rewarding to uncover and explore “cake” activities? 
Summary  
 In summary, most theorists agree that nonconscious factors play important roles in 
decision-making. Many have endorsed “dual-processing” models that postulate the existence of 
an intuitive, nonconscious information processing system in addition to the rational, conscious 
one of which we are all aware. Experimenters have used a variety of methods to induce decision-
making strategies that use primarily one of these two systems. Distinct patterns of results have 
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been observed, suggesting the intuitive system can make objectively better decisions under 
certain circumstances, and subjectively better decisions under many. This information has been 
adopted by vocational psychologists in order to better understand how individuals can be guided 
toward more optimal career-related decision-making strategies by making more effective interest 
forecasts.  
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Chapter III 
Methods 
  The purpose of this study was to understand how information processing strategies 
influence decisional outcomes. The methods have been designed to experimentally recreate, on a 
small scale, situations commonly encountered by decision-makers regarding the appraisal of 
their idiosyncratic interests. This chapter has been divided into three core sections: participants, 
measures and materials, and procedures.  
Participants 
Participants included 140 students from a large, Midwestern University. Of these, four 
had unusable data: one was considered a trial participant, one had technical difficulties, one had 
to discontinue during their video due to extraneous circumstances, and one did not follow 
researcher directions. These four participants were not used in any analyses, leaving a final 
sample pool of 136 individuals. Comparison group sample sizes are equivalent or greater than 
those in similar studies (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991; Wilson 
et al., 1993).  
Of the 136 participants in this study, 52 (38%) were female, and 84 (62%) were male. 
The ethnic breakdown of the sample was: 92 (67%) White, 15 (11%) Black, 10 (7%) Asian, 9 
(7%) Multiracial, 6 (4%) Hispanic, and 4 (4%) Other. Seven participants (5%) were international 
students. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 49, with a mean of age 21.45. They had, on average, 
completed approximately 53 credit hours, had a college grade point average of 3.05, and had 
been in college for approximately 2.5 years. In all, 52 different majors were represented in the 
sample. Seventeen participants (12.5%) were officially undecided at the time of data collection.  
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Measures and Materials 
 Informed Consent. All participants were presented an informed consent both verbally 
and in writing. Participants signed this form if willing to participate, which were kept on file by 
the researcher. See Appendix A for this document. Each participant was also provided with a 
copy of the informed consent for their own records.  
Demographic Questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire consisted of 14 items to 
determine sample representativeness as well as two questions that yield a rough measure of 
“decidedness” in major (used by Cox, 2008), and college GPA. See Appendix B for this 
questionnaire.  
Occupational Engagement Scale-Student (OES-Student). The OES-Student is a 14-
item measure that was originally developed by Black (2006) and then refined by Cox (2008) as a 
measure of collegiate student engagement (see Appendix C). Engagement is a theoretical 
extension of the Trilateral Model of Adaptive Career Decision-making (Krieshok et al., 2009). 
The measure has been shown to be reliable, demonstrating a coefficient alpha of .85, based on a 
sample of 311 undergraduates from various disciplines and advancement in college. This 
measure was chosen because it is a reliable and valid measure of behavioral occupational 
engagement in college populations (Cox, 2008). Previous interactions with the world are 
hypothesized to fund the decision-makers wealth of knowledge (Krieshok et al., 2009; Krieshok 
et al., 2011) and therefore influence decisional quality. Scores from this instrument will be used 
as a predictor and a covariate during analysis.  
In accordance with theory, previous versions of the OES were found to be positively 
related with a rational thinking style as measured by the REI and Vocational Identity (Black, 
2006), as well as Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Agreeableness in both gifted 
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high school students (McKay, 2008) and college students (Black, 2006). Cox (2008) found that 
the most current iteration, the OES-Student, was related to several measures of student well-
being.  
Rational-Experiential Inventory-Short (REI-Short). The REI-Short is a 10-item 
measure (see Appendix D) derived from a 59-item version by Epstein et al. (1996). The REI was 
developed based on the Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1994), and has two 
5-item factors: Faith in Intuition (FI) and Need for Closure (NFC). Alpha coefficients for the two 
factors were found to be .72 and .73, respectively, indicating sufficient internal consistency.  
Epstein et al., (1996) found that FI and NFC subscales were found to be independent of 
one another as hypothesized by CEST, and in support of the dual-process assertion that “there 
are two information processing systems, experiential and rational, that are independent and 
operate by different rules” (p. 401). As expected, the NFC subscale was found to be related to 
greater objective outcomes, while the FI scale was associated with greater use of heuristics while 
making decisions. Previous research indicates that trait comfort with decisional style affects the 
process and outcome of the decisional process (e.g., Gati, Landman, Davidovich, Asulin-Peretz, 
& Gadassi, 2010). Including REI subscale scores allowed researchers to control for these effects.   
Measures of Interest in Video and Choice Satisfaction. On five different occasions 
(before, twice during, immediately after, and two weeks following viewing video), participants 
were asked to indicate how interesting they believe they will find, are finding, or found the video 
they chose, as well as how satisfied they are with their choice. These were presented as an un-
numbered bipolar horizontal line, with each end labeled “Not at all interesting” and “Very 
interesting” for the interest questions, and “Not at all Satisfied” and Very Satisfied” for the 
satisfaction questions. See Appendix E for examples of these items.  
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Individuals were instructed to place a single strike through the line indicating their 
current attitude regarding the video. These marks were then scored with a standardized template 
to quantify the participant‟s response from 0 (not at all interested or satisfied) to 50 (very 
interested or satisfied). This method was used with success by Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2005), 
who incorporated this measurement style due to its sensitivity to subtle nonconscious affective 
changes.   
Video Options. Participants were asked to choose one of eight occupational/educational 
videos, labeled Video A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. Videos were selected from the Technology, 
Entertainment, and Design (TED) Conference series, an open-source, freely distributed project 
(see Appendix F for links to these videos). Each video contained a fifteen to eighteen minute 
lecture by an expert or researcher discussing what they believe to be the most exciting 
developments and latest trends in their respective fields. Videos were chosen based on their 
content, which represent a variety of different professions. Each was carefully screened for 
general quality, but there is no objective determinant of how well the lecturer delivers the content 
of their presentation. To control for differences in lecture quality, during-video interest levels 
from all participants who chose a particular video were averaged to obtain a general “video 
quality” metric for each option.  
Each video was summarized with a set of five different descriptions. The descriptions 
were standardized to ensure they were equal in information quality and quantity across job 
options. This was accomplished by formulating a standard set of questions from which to base 
the descriptions (See Table 1). Participants were asked to choose one of the videos based on 
these descriptors. The three decision groups, the conscious-rational (CR) group, the unconscious-
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intuitive (UI) group, and control differed only in the means by which this information was 
presented.  
Procedures 
 Participant Recruitment. Before beginning data collection, this project received 
approval through the governing Institutional Review Board. All research was conducted within 
APA ethical standards, and all participants were treated in accordance with human subjects 
review board guidelines.  
 The participant pool was gathered by entering classrooms in courses that appeal to a wide 
array of interests and majors, such as 100-level electives and remedial requirements. They 
included such courses as introductory math courses, communication elective, career exploration, 
and introduction to geology. Participants were asked to come to a predetermined classroom to 
engage in the experiment. Students were given either a $10 incentive or class credit for 
participation in this study. Data were collected through 39 separate data collections during the 
spring and summer terms of 2011. 
Experimental Manipulation. Small groups of participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three conditions, control, conscious-rational (CR), or unconscious-intuitive (UI) upon 
arriving for the experiment. Every participant, regardless of condition, began the study by 
completing the demographic questionnaire, the OES-Student and the REI-Short. All participants 
were told they would be asked to choose between a number of videos containing lectures by 
experts discussing their respective fields, and that after they chose, they would actually watch 
that video.  
Control condition. After completing the demographics sheet, OES-Student, and REI-
Short, participants in the control condition were given the “decision sheet” of organized video 
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descriptions (see Appendix G) and asked to choose the video that they would find most 
interesting. They were then given the pre-test measures of expected satisfaction with choice and 
interest, as well as their confidence in decision and current mood. Participants then watched the 
videos they chose. They were assessed for their current levels of interest and satisfaction with 
their choice at three time points: six minutes into the video, twelve minutes into the video, and 
immediately after the video. A general during-video interest score was obtained by averaging 
these three scores. Approximately two weeks later, participants took the follow-up survey.  
Conscious-Rational (CR) condition. Like the control condition, participants in the CR 
condition completed the demographic questionnaire, the OES-Student and REI-Short. Before 
choosing their video, however, they were asked to rate each description on a 9-point Likert scale. 
Participants were asked to consider each description carefully and determine the exact number 
that would represent their interest level. Pilot testing showed that participants needed 
approximately four and a half minutes to complete description ratings. Participants then tallied 
their scores for each video. Participants were then presented with the “decision sheet” of 
organized videos, and asked to choose the video they thought would interest them most.  
This method was intended to induce a hyper-rational, reductionistic decision-making 
strategy and simulate the methods and instruments, such as the Strong Interest Inventory 
(Donnay & Borgen, 1996) and the Self-Directed Search (Holland, 1978), that are common to 
career counseling. Similar means were used to successfully induce conscious-rational decision-
making strategies by Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) and Wilson and Schooler (1991, 
Experiment 2). Participants in the CR condition then watched the video they had chosen, and 
followed the same sequence of assessment as the control group. The descriptions upon which the 
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participants based their decisions were presented in a manner easily consumable on a conscious 
level, and the participants were asked to rationally evaluate the components of the video. 
Unconscious-Intuitive (UI) condition. Like the control and CR conditions, participants 
in the UI condition completed the demographic questionnaire, the OES-Student and REI-Short. 
Before being asked to choose between videos, however, participants in the UI group were 
presented the descriptions of the videos via computer program. For instance, one description read 
as follows:  “VIDEO A: Medicine.” All forty descriptions were flashed on the screen for three 
seconds at a time. This process was repeated, so that UI condition participants watched the 
presentation for a total of four and a half minutes. Participants were given instructions not to 
attempt to memorize these prompts, but to simply “remain attentive and attempt to absorb the 
information.”  
After this, the UI group was given a distracter task consisting of an anagram puzzle 
consisting of 23 five- and six- letter words. Anagram words were selected from the Affective 
Norms for English Words (ANEW) word list (Bradley & Lang, 1999). Only words deemed 
emotionally neutral and non-arousing were considered. Participants engaged in the anagram 
puzzle for 300 seconds. This anagram distracter task was intended to allow for unconscious 
thought and the development of affective, gist-level appraisals of the options. Participants were 
then presented with the “decision sheet” of organized video descriptions, and asked to choose the 
video they thought would interest them most. 
Follow-up. Approximately two weeks following the initial data collection, researchers 
returned to the classes from which participants were recruited in order to obtain a follow-up 
survey. Participants were asked to read the descriptions of the videos and select the one they 
watched. They then answered five questions regarding how interested they remember being in 
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the video, how satisfied they were with their choice, how much they had thought about the 
content, and how likely they are to seek more information about the content of their video. In 
addition, they were asked to estimate how many times they had discussed the content of their 
video with others over the past two weeks. Of the 136 usable participants, 115 (85%) completed 
the follow-up survey.  
Summary of Variables. This methodology yields nine variables of primary importance 
to test the hypotheses. See Table 2 for a summary of these variables. 
Data Analysis 
It was the purpose of this study to experimentally reproduce career-related decisions 
students and workers commonly encounter by asking individuals to choose one of eight 
occupational/educational videos. Their reported interest levels can be tracked longitudinally as a 
measure of decision quality. This method supports the general research questions of this study as 
well as specific tests of the hypotheses generated by the literature to date. These hypotheses are 
highly tentative, as there has been no direct test of the effects of decisional strategy (i.e., 
unconscious-intuitive, conscious-rational, and control) on decision quality (i.e., interest levels). 
Current mood, trait comfort with rational and intuitive cognitive styles (as measured by the REI-
FI and REI-NFC subscales), and video quality were potential confounds to the assessment of 
interest and were statistically controlled. All of the following hypotheses represented expected 
significant effects after accounting for these factors.  
Hypothesis 1. Levels of occupational engagement, as measured by the OES-Student (Cox, 
2008), were hypothesized to be positively correlated with choice quality, as measured by self-
reported levels of interest during the video. Furthermore, this relationship was expected to be 
considerably more pronounced for the unconscious-intuitive group. These relationships were 
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tested using partial correlations to control for variables that may confound the observation of 
these relationships. 
Hypothesis 2.  The unconscious-intuitive condition group was expected to choose, on 
average, videos that they found more interesting than the conscious-rational or control conditions, 
as measured by self-reported levels of interest during their videos. Group differences were 
analyzed using an analysis of co-variance that statistically adjusted for participant variables that 
may have systematically affected groups.  
Hypothesis 3. The following patterns were expected to emerge. The conscious-rational 
group was expected to have relatively high pre-video interest (indicating high confidence in 
choice), relatively low during-video interest (indicating poorer choice quality), and relatively 
high two-week follow-up interest (indicating a “mis-remembering” of the event). The opposite 
pattern was expected for the unconscious-intuitive group. The unconscious-intuitive group was 
expected to have relatively low pre-video interest (indicating low confidence in choice), 
relatively high during-video interest (indicating better choice quality), and relatively low two-
week follow-up interest (indicating a “mis-remembering” of the event). Overall, the trends in 
mean scores across time between UI, CR, and control groups were expected to vary significantly. 
These trends were analyzed using a repeated-measure analysis of co-variance. See Figure 1 for a 
graphic representation of this hypothesis. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
The methods of this study were designed to broadly address two questions. First, does 
occupational engagement relate to decision quality? Second, does the information processing 
strategy employed by the decider preceding the decision influence decision quality or the 
hindsight appraisal of that experience? Based on the extant literature, three hypotheses were 
developed to address these questions. This chapter will present the results of the analyses testing 
these hypotheses. Before doing so, however, information is included regarding the variables of 
interest. All variables involved are statistically described, tests for group differences in 
demographics are detailed, and the correlation matrix of variables reported.  
All hypotheses were tested with an a priori alpha level of .05 using the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 18. Of the variables within this study, a number are 
significant characterological or contextual participant variables that may confound hypothesis 
testing: participant mood, Rational-Experiential Inventory‟s Need for Closure (REI-NFC) and 
Faith in Intuition (REI-FI) subscales, video quality, and Occupational Engagement Scale score. 
Interest and satisfaction scores before, during and two weeks after the video are considered 
outcome variables.  
Statistical Description of Variables  
 Of the 136 total participants, 44 were assigned to the control condition, 44 were assigned 
to the conscious-rational condition, and 48 to the unconscious-intuitive condition. Table 3 
contains the possible range, observed range, mean, standard deviation, skew and kurtosis values 
for the examined variables in the overall sample (N = 136). Although during-video and follow-
up video scores displayed elevated kurtosis and skew levels, Byrne (2010) does not recommend 
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transforming variables with skew and kurtosis values of less than 5.0 when conducting 
multivariate analyses based on the general linear model, which includes all following analyses. 
All variables were therefore considered sufficiently normal.  
Single sample t-tests were performed to determine if the current sample had significantly 
different OES-Student scores than those found in studies with similar populations. Based on a 
one-sample t-test, the mean OES-Student scores for this sample, 37.83, is significantly higher 
than the mean of 32.53 Cox (2008) found in college students, t(135) = 6.55, p < .001.This 
indicates that the students in this sample report significantly more behavioral engagement than 
those in the normative sample for this instrument.  
Testing for Systematic Group Differences 
Since participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions, 
there is no reason to believe that the groups would differ based on any demographic or 
participant characteristics. One-way Analyses of Variance were conducted with Bonferroni post 
hoc tests in order to determine if groups systematically differed at baseline for trait variables. 
There were no significant differences among groups for OES-Student score, REI-NFC and REI-
FI scores. It was also important to determine if experimental manipulation had differential effects 
on participant mood. An analysis of variance was conducted with a Bonferroni post hoc 
correction, which was not significant.  
Furthermore, it was expected that participants would choose different videos at roughly 
the same rate, regardless of group. A Chi-square test for goodness-of-fit was not significant, 
indicating that video decisions did not differ across groups. The mean video quality score was 
likewise not expected to differ among groups. Another analysis of variance was conducted to 
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ensure that average video quality scores did not differ between groups. This test was also not 
significant.  
 Based on these results it can be concluded that the three experimental conditions did not 
significantly differ based on any characterological or contextual variables. This indicates that 
random assignment successfully created homogenous groups, and experimental manipulation did 
not significantly impact participant mood.  
 There is one more observation of note. Participants in the CR condition were asked to 
complete a short interest inventory that resulted in scores from 5 to 45 for each of the videos. 
They were then asked to choose any one of the videos they believed they would like. Four of the 
44 (9%) participants assigned to the CR condition chose a video other than the video rated as 
highest. Although these participants may not have explicitly used the conscious-rational data 
supplied by the inventory, a conscious-rational response set was still induced. Examination of 
these participants‟ inventories revealed that all of them chose their second highest scoring option, 
each of which was within a few points of the highest scoring option. Therefore, these participants 
were considered to have adopted a conscious-rational strategy, even if it was not fully 
implemented.  
Correlation Matrix 
Using the entire sample (N = 136), bivariate correlations among the eight principle 
variables used in this study resulted in the matrix displayed in Table 5. Several of these analyses 
merit further discussion. Several participant state and trait variables were found to be 
significantly related to self-reported interest levels at the three time samples. Participant mood 
immediately before video was found to be strongly related to pre-video interest, r(134) = .39, p 
< .001, interest during the video, r(135) = .32, p < .001, and at follow-up, r(114) = .30, p < .001. 
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The REI Need for Closure subscale scores were associated with greater interest at all three time 
points as well: before the video, r(134) = .29, p < .001, during the video, r(135) = .23, p = .01, 
and at follow-up, r(114) = .28, p = .002. Video quality was not related with pre-video interest 
ratings, but was significantly associated with during-video interest, r(135) = .37, p < .001, and 
interest at follow-up, r(114) = .34, p < .001. 
Occupational Engagement Scale scores were significantly related to a number of 
covariates, including mood, r(136) = .23, p < .01, and REI-NFC, r(136) = .27, p < .001. OES 
scores were also found to be significantly associated with interest levels before the video, r(135) 
= .27, p < .001, during the video, r(136) = .31, p < .001, and at follow-up, r(115) = .32, p < .001.  
Finally, it is important to note that there were significant correlations between interest 
levels at the three time points. Pre-video interest levels are significantly related to during video 
interest scores r(135) = .30, p < .001, and those at follow-up, r(114) = .39, p < .001. During-
video interest level was very highly correlated with reported interest at follow-up, r(115) = .93, p 
< .001.  
Hypothesis 1  
 Levels of occupational engagement, as measured by the OES-Student (Cox, 2008), will be 
positively correlated with choice quality, as measured by self-reported levels of interest during 
the video. Furthermore, this relationship is expected to be considerably more pronounced for the 
unconscious-intuitive group. 
As reported above, a bivariate correlation between OES scores and during-video interest 
scores was significant, r(134) = .31, p < .001, when using the entire sample. To further explicate 
this finding, four partial bivariate correlations were conducted to examine the relationship 
between Occupational Engagement Scale (OES) scores and interest levels during the video. Each 
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analysis controlled for participant mood, REI-FI scores, REI-NFC scores, and video quality. 
After controlling for these factors, the correlation between OES scores and during-video interest 
for the entire sample remained significant, r(109) = .26, p = .005. This correlation was also 
significant when examining only the control group, r(32) = .40, p = .02. This correlation was not 
significant, however, for either the conscious-rational group, r(33) = .23, p = .18, or the 
unconscious-intuitive group, r(32) = .16, p = .38. This trend was also found when the variance 
associated with pre-video interest levels was partialled out: the control group displayed a 
significant correlation between OES scores and during video interest, r(31) = .41, p = .02; but 
this was not the case for the conscious-rational Group, r(32) = .21, p = .22, or the unconscious-
intuitive group, r(30) = .08, p = .69. 
Furthermore, when two week follow-up interest levels were subjected to correlations 
controlling participant mood, REI-FI scores, REI-NFC scores, and video quality, the identical 
trends emerge. Looking at all three groups together, there is a significant relationship to between 
participant OES score and interest level at the two-week follow-up, r(109) = .22, p = .02. This 
correlation was again significant for the control group, r(32) = .37, p = .03, but not for either the 
conscious-rational group, r(33) = .22, p = .19, or the unconscious-intuitive group, r(32) = .06, p 
= .75. This trend was also found when the variance associated with pre-video interest levels was 
partialled out: the control group displayed a significant correlation between OES scores and 
follow-up interest, r(31) = .39, p = .03; but this was not the case for the conscious-rational Group, 
r(32) = .18, p = .31, or the unconscious-intuitive group, r(30) = .004, p = .98. 
These results offer general support to the idea that occupational engagement, as measured 
by the OES-Student, is related to better interest forecasting, as measured by interest in participant 
video of choice. Contrary to expectation, however, this association was significantly stronger for 
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the control group, and was weakest for the unconscious-intuitive group. See Table 6 for these 
correlations.  
Interest Levels over Time 
 The remaining hypotheses regard mean interest levels of the three groups across the three 
time points of interest: before, during, and two-weeks following the video. These nine data 
points serve as the basis for the analyses testing Hypotheses 2 and 3, as well as the inferences 
that follow. The raw mean interest scores for the three groups will be presented, followed by 
those same scores adjusted for the covariates previously discussed.  
 Raw mean interest scores for the control group were: pre-video mean of 37.21 (SD = 
8.82); during-video mean of 38.25 (SD = 12.06); and follow-up mean of 36.47 (SD = 12.77). 
Raw mean interest scores for the conscious-rational group were: pre-video mean of 39.36 (SD = 
6.66); during-video mean of 41.05 (SD = 7.93); and follow-up mean of 39.54 (SD = 9.52). Raw 
mean interest scores for the unconscious-intuitive group were: pre-video mean of 38.62 (SD = 
8.89); during-video mean of 41.86 (SD = 8.38); and follow-up mean of 41.27 (SD = 9.22). See 
Figure 2 for a graphic representation of these differences.  
Raw means were then adjusted by controlling for the eight covariates thought to be 
meaningfully related to interest scores – mood, OES score, REI-NFC, NFC-FI, and video quality 
– creating estimated interest levels after removing of the statistical impact of these variables on 
interest scores. Adjusted mean interest scores for the control group were: pre-video adjusted 
mean of 37.70 (Standard Error of Estimate = 1.22); during-video adjusted mean of 38.91 
(Standard Error = 1.37); and follow-up adjusted mean of 37.21 (Standard Error = 1.53). Adjusted 
mean interest scores for the conscious-rational group were: pre-video adjusted mean of 38.91 
(Standard Error = 1.21); during-video adjusted mean of 40.70 (Standard Error = 1.35); and 
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follow-up adjusted mean of 39.14 (Standard Error = 1.51). Adjusted mean interest scores for the 
unconscious-intuitive group were: pre-video adjusted mean of 38.60 (Standard Error = 1.23); 
during-video adjusted mean of 41.57 (Standard Error = 1.38); and follow-up adjusted mean of 
40.93 (Standard Error = 1.55). See Figure 3 for a graphic representation of these differences.  
A 3 x 3 (group by time) repeated-measures analysis of covariance was conducted on this 
model, yielding a number of general conclusions regarding these data, which will be further 
discussed in the sections to follow.  All of the following statistics required a Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected degrees of freedom to compensate for a violation of the assumption of sphericity. First, 
a significant interaction between group and time did not appear, F(2.46, 130.43) = .55, p = .61; 
nor did a main effect for group, F(2, 106) = 1.22, p =.30. Finally, significant main effects did 
emerge for time, F(1.23, 130.43) = 6.89, p = .006, ƞ2 = .06.  
Unfortunately, there are no accepted post-hoc procedures for repeated measures analyses 
of covariance (Keppel & Wickens, 2004). Figure 3 was therefore instrumental in guiding post-
hoc analyses. In order to reduce the chances of a Type I error, follow-up tests were implemented 
parsimoniously; only as suggested by the data and required by the hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 2 
 The unconscious-intuitive condition will, on average, choose videos that they find more 
interesting than the conscious-rational or control conditions, as measured by self-reported levels 
of interest during their videos. 
This hypothesis was first tested by using an analysis of covariance to determine group 
mean differences in during-video interest scores after controlling for the effects of mood, OES 
score, REI-NFC and NFC-FI scores, and video quality. An omnibus analysis of variance found 
that during-video interest levels for the control group (M = 38.90, Standard Error of Estimate = 
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1.27), conscious-rational group (M = 40.92, Standard Error = 1.27), and unconscious-intuitive 
Group (M = 41.41, Standard Error = 1.22) were not significantly different, F(2,128) = 1.11, p 
= .33. This is essentially a test of the difference between groups at the “during-video” time 
interval in Figure 3. Although the omnibus test was not found to be significant, a visual 
inspection of this graphic revealed the greatest difference is between the control and UI groups. 
A direct comparison of the UI (M = 38.69, Standard Error = 1.37) and control groups (M = 41.10, 
Standard Error = 1.31), was not significant, F(1, 85) = 1.60, p = .21.  
Following this test, pre-video levels of interest were added as an additional covariate. 
This addition did not drastically change either the significance of the omnibus test, F(1,83) = 
1.47, p = .23, or the difference (2.30) between these the UI (M = 38.63, SD = 11.97) and control 
(M = 41.46, SD = 9.08) groups.  
Although a cursory examination of the mean interest level for the different groups during 
the video indicates that an unconscious-intuitive strategy produced more effective results, the 
statistical analyses are inconclusive. An omnibus test of differences between groups did not yield 
significant results. It is common practice to halt further analysis after a nonsignificant omnibus 
test, but an additional test was conducted in order to see if there was a difference between the 
two most disparate groups: the control and UI conditions. This test was likewise nonsignificant. 
It can therefore be concluded that if significant differences between groups exist (as Figure 3 
suggests), this study was unable to detect them. There is little definitive support for Hypothesis 2.  
However, when examining Figure 3, it appears as though follow-up scores may display 
greater mean differences between groups than those reported during-video scores. The same 
process of analysis was also performed for the data at follow-up again controlling for the five 
covariates outlined previously. Once again, the omnibus analysis of variance between the control 
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group (M = 37.08, Standard Error = 1.52), CR group (M = 39.01, Standard Error = 1.51) and UI 
group (M = 40.91, Standard Error = 1.52) was not significant F(2,107) = 1.58, p = .21.  
A univariate analysis of variance was used to compare the two most disparate groups, 
which was the control group (M = 36.91, Standard Error = 1.56) and the UI group (M = 40.57, 
Standard Error = 1.56). This test was found to approach significance, F(1, 69) = 2.75, p = .10, ƞ2 
= .04. 
Based on these analyses and contrary to Hypothesis 2, no significant differences between 
the UI and CR conditions emerged at either the during-video or follow-up time points. However, 
the difference between the adjusted mean UI group interest score and the control group adjusted 
mean interest score was the largest observed, and was found to approach significance at follow-
up.  
Hypothesis 3 
Overall, the trends in mean scores across time between UI, CR, and control groups are 
expected to vary significantly. 
This hypothesis was tested using a repeated measures analysis of covariance analyzing 
the different groups over time after controlling for mood, OES score, REI-NFC, NFC-FI, and 
video quality (see Figure 3). As previously mentioned, this did not produce the expected 
interaction effect, F(2.46, 130.43) = .55, p = .61. This suggests that, contrary to Hypothesis 3, the 
three groups performed in similar patterns across time. However, a main effect did emerge for 
time, F(1.23, 130.43) = 6.89, p = .006, ƞ2 = .06. Upon inspection of the means associated with 
the three time periods, pre-video (M = 38.40, Standard Error = .70), during-video (M = 40.39, 
Standard Error = .78), and follow-up (M = 39.10, Standard Error = .88), a distinct inverted “V” 
pattern emerged. An initial Least Significant Differences post-hoc test indicated that the increase 
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(1.97) from pre-video to during-video interest levels are significant (p = .03), and the decrease (-
1.3) from during-video interest to post-video interest is likewise significant (p = .001).  
Based on Figure 3, it appears that both the control and CR groups display a similar 
pattern: pre-video adjusted mean interest scores appear to be very similar to follow-up post-video 
adjusted mean interest scores, while the during-video interest scores appear significantly greater. 
This pattern is much less distinct for the UI group.  
These observations were explored through a set of focused repeated measures analyses of 
covariance in order to determine how participant two-week follow-up interest levels relate to 
those observed during and before the video. Each group was analyzed using an omnibus analysis 
of covariance, followed by direct comparisons of the relationship between both follow-up scores 
and during-video scores, and follow-up scores and pre-video interest scores. Based on the 
evidence thus far presented, it appears that there is little evidence for Hypothesis 3 as previously 
outlined. There is reason to believe, though, that two-week follow-up scores for the UI group 
may break a pattern established by both the control and CR groups. That is, it appears that 
control and CR group follow-up scores are almost identical to their pre-interest scores, whereas 
the UI group follow-up scores are almost identical to their during-video interest levels.  
The Control Group (N = 38). Using a repeated measures analysis of covariance 
controlling for the five covariates, the difference between adjusted mean pre-video interest 
scores (M = 37.21, Standard Error = 1.35) and adjusted mean follow-up scores (M = 36.47, 
Standard Error = 1.74) was not found to be significant F(1, 32) = .68, p = .68, for the control 
group. However, there was a significant overall decline from the mean during-video interest 
score (M = 38.25, Standard Error = 1.66) and that at follow-up (M = 36.47, Standard Error = 
1.74), F(1, 32) = 5.57, p = .02, ƞ2 = .15. This analysis reveals that the control group displays the 
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same inverted “V” pattern as the overall sample. This pattern suggests that, for the control group, 
recollections of interest after two weeks were statistically indistinguishable from pre-video 
interest scores, and significantly lower than they reported during the video itself.  
The Conscious-Rational Group (N = 39). Using the same statistical procedure, the 
difference between adjusted mean pre-video interest scores (M = 39.36, Standard Error = .92) 
and adjusted mean follow-up scores (M = 39.54, Standard Error = 1.43) was not found to be 
significant for the CR group, F(1, 33) = .13, p = .91. However, there was a significant overall 
decline from the mean during-video interest score (M = 41.05, Standard Error = 1.12) and that at 
follow-up (M = 39.54, Standard Error = 1.43), F (1, 33) = 6.39, p = .02, ƞ2 = .16. This analysis 
revealed that the CR group displays the same inverted “V” pattern as the control group and 
overall sample. This pattern suggests that, for the CR group (like the control group), 
recollections of interest after two weeks was statistically indistinguishable from pre-video 
interest scores and significantly lower than they reported during the video itself. 
The Unconscious-Intuitive Group (N = 37). Again using the same statistical procedure, 
it was found that the difference between adjusted mean pre-video interest scores (M = 38.62, 
Standard Error = 1.39) and adjusted mean follow-up scores (M = 41.27, Standard Error = 1.38) 
was found to approach significance for the UI group, F(1, 31) = 2.89, p = .10,  ƞ2 = .09. There 
was no significant overall decline from the mean during-video interest score (M = 41.86, 
Standard Error = 1.27) and that at follow-up (M = 41.27, Standard Error = 1.38), F(1, 31) = .99, 
p = .33. This pattern of significance is opposite of that displayed by the control and CR groups. 
For the UI group, recollection of interest after two weeks was statistically indistinguishable from 
during-video interest scores and significantly greater than expected interest levels reported 
before the video.  
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These results, although clearly different from the exact predictions of Hypothesis 3, 
represent marked trends across time. When reflecting on their experience, participants from the 
control and CR conditions rated their interest level as essentially identical to what they had 
predicted it would be before the video began and significantly different from what it was during 
the video. In short, results indicate that after two weeks the participants in these groups recalled 
their expectation, not their experience. Participants from the UI group showed the opposite 
pattern. When reflecting on their experience, participants from the UI condition rated their 
interest level as essentially identical to what they reported during the video, and greater than they 
had expected. After two weeks, the UI group recalled their experience, not simply their 
expectation. 
Behavioral Indicators of Interest 
 Several questions were included with the two-week follow-up to determine the degree to 
which participants reported increased private (e.g., thinking about) and public (e.g., discussions, 
internet searches) behaviors as a result of having encountered the content of their video. There 
were no hypotheses formulated regarding these behavioral measures of interest. Preliminary 
omnibus analyses of variance were conducted to determine if the groups differed based on the 
reported levels of these behaviors. None of these analyses indicated significant differences 
between groups for any of these constructs. See Table 7 for descriptions, means and standard 
deviations for these variables. 
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CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
This chapter is a discussion of the findings gleaned from this study. A short overview is 
presented before a contextualization of the methods employed by this study. Results of the 
hypothesis testing are summarized and considered in light of hypotheses and previous research. 
This is followed by a general discussion that represents a synthesis of the conclusions in order to 
address the research questions guiding this study. Implications for practice, limitations of this 
study and future directions are then offered.  
Overview 
The structure of this experiment simulated common decision-making situations. Three 
different conditions were created in order to manipulate how participants processed information 
preceding a decision. Regardless of condition, each participant reached the same decision point. 
They were all presented identical “decision pages” (see Appendix G) with identical choices, 
identical descriptions of those choices, and identical instructions. How participants interacted 
with these descriptions before committing to a decision constituted the only difference between 
groups. By assessing interest levels as an outcome variable across time, the results of this study 
yielded some insight into how different information processing strategies affect the subjective 
quality of decisions.  
The current project introduces a new term, “interest forecasting.” This term symbolizes 
the merger between the highly practical realm of vocational psychology and the highly 
experimental realm of social psychology. The first half of the term, “interest” denotes the 
tradition and importance of interest assessment in vocational psychology. The second half of the 
term “forecasting” denotes the recent decision-making literature spun from cognitive and social 
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psychology experiments and theory. Interest forecasts are hypothesized to function like any 
affective forecast, which are predictions about the emotional consequences of making a 
particular choice (i.e., Gilbert & Wilson, 2000). Traditional career assessments, such as the 
Strong Interest Inventory (Donnay & Borgen, 1996) and the Self-Directed Search (Holland, 
1978) implicitly rely on such forecasts. The optimization of these forecasts is of paramount 
importance to the field of vocational psychology.  
Experimental Conditions 
 Participants in the control condition simply chose between video options. In this 
condition, participants were not forced to interact with the material in any meaningful or 
structured way. This was the most transparent of the conditions, and participants were free to use 
any decisional strategy they would like. There was no experimental manipulation other than the 
response demands of the experiment.  
Participants in the conscious-rational condition were asked to carefully and thoughtfully 
fill out a short interest inventory to help guide their selection. They attached numbers to their 
interest level regarding each description in a highly reductionistic, rational approach. In terms of 
the dual-processing literature reviewed previously, these procedures hyperactivated participants‟ 
System 2 (Kahneman, 2003).  This aspect of the study simulated interest inventories commonly 
in use by career counselors.  
Participants in the unconscious-intuitive condition were exposed to the descriptions and 
precluded from conscious interaction with the data. The manipulation in this condition drew 
inspiration from two theories. First, Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006) has suggested that supplying time between stimulus and decision is a more effective 
decisional strategy, as long as the time is not spent in conscious deliberation. Second, both 
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Krieshok et al.‟s (2009) Trilateral Model and Reyna and Brainerd‟s (1995) Fuzzy Trace Theory 
assert that becoming immersed in stimuli related to a decision - not simply thinking about it - 
creates an intuitive fund of experiential knowledge, which results in affect-laden gists of work 
environments. Though this was not an expressed goal of the UI manipulation, affective gist 
formation through stimulus immersion was an ancillary effect of this methodology. This 
procedure activated System 1 (Kahneman, 2003), while precluding conscious thought (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  
 Elements of methodology, such as the distracter task and graphic rating scale assessments 
that pertain to Unconscious Thought Theory were drawn from procedures employed with success 
by Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006). The results of this line of research have been discussed in 
depth in the previous review of literature. The authors framed their findings, an in-part 
replication of the Wilson et al. (1993) “poster study,” within the larger decision-making literature 
in the following way: 
“The experiment extends earlier work by Dijksterhuis (2004; see also Dijksterhuis 
and Nordgren, in press) in two important ways: First, quality of decision was 
operationalized subjectively rather than normatively, and second, participants 
chose something real. Having people choose among hypothetical objects is one 
thing, but having people choose among actual objects and then having their post-
choice satisfaction affected by how they arrived at their choices in the first place 
is more intriguing. The current findings make our earlier conclusion that 
unconscious thought can lead to superior decisions much more ecologically valid 
and practically relevant” (p. 631).  
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The current research likewise used subjective measures of decision quality, and participants also 
chose something real. Instead of choosing between actual objects, however, participants in this 
study chose between actual experiences. Furthermore, in the study cited above, participants were 
asked to rate objects for desirability before being told they would receive them as a prize, 
making the judgment independent from perceived consequence. Participants in this study were 
precisely aware of what they were selecting and the ramifications of that decision, as the demand 
characteristics and experimental sequence were clearly defined (i.e., they were told “you will 
choose a video and then watch it”). Finally, the decision point was exactly the same for each 
participant. Each participant, regardless of condition, was free to use any decisional strategy they 
would like at the point of decision. But, participants were not free to choose the means by which 
they interacted with the stimuli (i.e., experimental manipulation) before the decision point.  
 This study retained the methodological improvements of the Dijksterhuis and van Olden 
(2006) study and created a more authentic decision-making context by increasing participant 
freedom and experiment transparency. Presentation of stimuli in brief, two-second intervals is 
methodologically unprecedented in the affective forecasting literature, but work regarding speed-
based judgment tasks, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 
1998), indicates that quickly processed information is indeed a meaningful assessment technique. 
Repeated exposure to a large amount of information processed on a nonconscious level was also 
intended to produce an immersive, experiential effect, functioning primarily on the high-
bandwidth, affectively driven System 1. In this way, it was expected to function as a more richly 
engaging experience than simply deciding (the control condition) or consciously reasoning 
through a decision (the conscious-rational condition).  
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 In summary, the methodology employed in this study has experimental and theoretical 
bases. The way “interest forecasts” have been defined and evaluated in the current study has two 
implications. First, it is an extension of the social and cognitive psychology literature regarding 
dual-processes into more practically significant territory.  Likewise, it is a well-controlled, 
internally valid means of examining Anti-introspectivist Career Theory (Krieshok, 1998) and the 
role of occupational engagement as defined by the Trilateral Model (Krieshok et al., 2009).  
Summary of the Findings 
 The results of each analysis will be discussed along with an analysis of how each 
deviated from expectation. Since this project was largely unprecedented and exploratory, many 
hypotheses were tentative and many of the findings were surprising. They have been interpreted 
based on the current data and in light of the available literature. An integration of the relevant 
conclusions will then be presented as a general discussion of findings.   
 Hypothesis 1. In general, it was hypothesized that engagement would be found to be 
related to the quality of occupational decision-making. It was expected to be positively correlated 
to decision quality, and this was expected to be especially pronounced in the unconscious-
intuitive condition.  
In support of the first hypothesis, Occupational Engagement Scale (OES) scores were 
found to be related to reported interest levels during the videos they chose. There are a number of 
possible explanations for this finding. First, it is possible that the OES measures not just a 
personal history with occupational engagement activities, but a trait propensity to find activities 
interesting, or a general propensity toward positive affective states. This underlying quality could 
potentially account for this relationship. Based on an examination of each group independently, 
however, it appears that the majority of the power behind this association is drawn from the 
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control group. In fact, the control group was the only one that displayed a significant relationship 
between OES scores and during-video interest levels. If high occupational engagement scores 
represent a latent variable that makes it more likely a participant will find any video interesting, 
it would be expected that the relationship would be observed across all groups. 
 The relationship between the two variables most likely represents, as operationalized, an 
association between past engagement behaviors and choice quality, as participants were 
specifically tasked with choosing the video they would find most interesting. Under this 
interpretation, it can be stated that increased engagement behaviors are related to better interest 
forecasts. There is, of course, no way to determine the directionality of a correlation. This 
relationship is likely to be reciprocal: greater engagement leads to better choices, which leads to 
greater interest in the selected choices, which in turn inspires more engagement behavior. In 
general, it can be concluded that greater engagement behaviors, as measured by the OES, are 
related to better occupational/educational interest forecasts. 
 It was surprising to find that this relationship only exists for the control group. This 
finding appears to be robust for a number of reasons. First, the partial correlation accounted for a 
number of variables that could confound the relationship. Second, the same pattern of findings 
(i.e., the control group showed a relationship while the others did not) existed after accounting 
for pre-video interest levels. Finally, the same pattern emerged at follow-up. All evidence 
suggests that when individuals are left to their own devices, a medium strength, positive 
relationship exists between occupational engagement and occupational choice quality.  
It would be difficult to conclude that some aspect of the control condition elicited, 
manufactured or amplified this relationship, as there was no manipulation. It is more likely that 
some element of the conscious-rational and unconscious-intuitive conditions muted it. 
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Attempting to answer why this has been observed is speculative at this point. It is possible that 
previous engagement activities are especially informative for usual decisional strategies of the 
individual, and inducing unconscious-intuitive or conscious-rational strategies pushed deciders 
off of their usual decision-making approach. The two experimental conditions induced different 
kinds of thought (conscious and unconscious) through structured interaction with the stimuli. 
This structured, thoughtful interaction with the material resulted in less of a need to rely on 
engagement to make good decisions. Engagement seems to be especially beneficial in situations 
where the demands of the decision constrain or preclude structure or robust conscious or 
unconscious thought. That is, if individuals are not forced to interact with decision relevant 
stimuli under ambiguous circumstances (both experimental conditions were forced to interact 
with the material before selecting the chosen video), they will revert to the use of simple 
heuristics, as research indicates this is the easiest and most commonly used decision strategy 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). Under such circumstances, it appears that previous engagement 
activities will be associated with better occupational/educational decisions. This raises the 
distinct possibility that occupational engagement streamlines the heuristics used for interest 
forecasts.  
Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis sought to determine if decisional strategy 
significantly affected the quality of interest forecasts. It was expected that the unconscious-
intuitive condition would produce better decisions than the conscious-rational condition. During-
video interest levels were considered to be the best operationalization of decision quality, when 
other contextual and characterological factors were controlled.  
At its core, this inquiry was intended to answer the question, “Which group chose the 
best?” The means of the three groups indicated that the UI condition produced the most effective 
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decisions, followed by the CR condition, and then the control condition. Despite trends in that 
direction, there was little support for significant distinction between groups based on the during-
video interest levels. When statistically controlling for pre-video interest levels, the magnitude of 
the difference between groups did not change significantly: the UI group outperformed the CR 
group, which outperformed the control group; although the differences did not reach significance. 
A visual inspection of group performance over time (Figure 3), reveals these trends, and suggests 
that group differences became amplified at follow-up. This appeared to be the case, as the 
difference between UI and control group interest levels at follow-up were found to approach 
significance.  
Mean group interest scores over time seem to establish a pattern, but the power of the 
current analyses does not appear adequate to establish statistical significance. Previous studies 
(e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) were able to find significant 
differences with sample sizes of this size or smaller. These studies however, were more carefully 
controlled. The current study sacrificed some experimental control and power in order to 
increase ecological validity and generalizability. Subtle trends emerged, but the magnitude of 
these trends was not sufficient to determine statistical significance. No substantial differences 
were observed at the pre-video time-point. Clear stratification appeared at the during-video time 
point, and this distinction increased at follow-up. The apparent reliability of group differences 
from during the video to follow-up suggests that these group differences may be small but stable.  
So, the answer to the question, “Which group chose best?” is inconclusive. While 
watching the video, there appeared to be little difference between interest levels between groups. 
At follow-up, however, there is some support for the contention that an unconscious-intuitive 
strategy is superior to the unstructured control condition. Forcing individuals to nonconsciously 
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engage with decision-salient stimuli appears to be somewhat helpful, even if that interaction is 
fleeting. This test offers tentative evidence that there are systematic differences between 
decisional strategies on interest forecasts, and that those made under unconscious-intuitive 
conditions will result in higher quality decisions, especially when compared to control conditions.  
Hypothesis 3. In many ways, this was the most telling examination of the data, as it 
considers the interest levels of all groups across time. A significant interaction was expected, 
with distinctive patterns of response for each group. It was suspected that follow-up interest 
levels would return to pre-video interest levels, since individuals have a tendency to remember 
events as they expected to experience them, instead of how they actually experienced them 
(Wilson, 2002).  
No interaction was found, as all three groups had similar patterns of response over time, 
but a main effect emerged for time. The overall sample showed an inverted “v” pattern of 
interest over time.  Participants seemed to be pleasantly surprised by their videos, as they were 
more interested during the video than they expected they would be. When asked two weeks later, 
however, they reported interest levels indistinguishable from their pre-video expectation, and 
significantly below that which they reported during their video. An identical pattern of response 
was also found for the control and conscious-rational groups. This data supports a remarkable 
conclusion: after two weeks, participants in the CR and control groups more closely recalled 
their expectation of the video, not their experience of it.  
Participants in the unconscious-intuitive group were likewise pleasantly surprised by how 
interested they were during their video, as indicated by a dramatic increase from pre-video to 
during-video interest level. Unlike the other two groups, however, follow-up video scores 
decreased only slightly from during-video scores. In fact, follow-up interest scores were 
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statistically indistinguishable from during-video scores, and were considerably higher than their 
scores pre-video. This data supports a very different conclusion: after two weeks, participants in 
the unconscious-intuitive condition more closely recalled their experience of the video, not their 
expectation of it.  
This raises the intriguing possibility that pre-decisional strategy may have downstream 
effects above and beyond simply influencing which option is chosen. In this case, the manner in 
which one contemplated an occupational/educational decision appears to have influenced how 
accurately one recalled internal states (i.e., interest levels) during an event. It is certain that 
decision-makers in the CR condition - and likely that those in the control condition - produced 
conscious, rational, logical reasons for their affective forecasts. Although this may not 
necessarily have resulted in significantly poorer choices (see discussion of Hypothesis 2), it 
seems to have resulted in significantly poorer recollections of those choices. When recalling the 
experience, the logic and reasoning leading up to the choice became an impediment, a distraction 
from the reminiscence of the experience of the event itself. In this case, participants were 
surprised about how much interest they had in the video, so the experience of the event was 
somewhat discrepant from their forecast.  
Creating or deliberating about a logical set of reasons for how much or little something 
should interest you creates two separate and competing experiences: the creation of a prediction 
about an event and the event itself. When asked to evaluate an event, then, it places elements of 
System 2 (the logical, rational, symbolic self activated by the reasoned prediction) in direct 
opposition to elements of System 1 (the emotional, experiential self activated by the event itself). 
After two weeks, these rival experiences are likely to be easily confused. When the descriptions 
of the videos were re-presented and asked for single evaluation of the memory, the logic behind 
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the prediction can be easily recalled, as one‟s self-narrative and video descriptions have not 
changed. The interest eliciting aspects of the video - those characteristics that made the video 
surprisingly interesting - however, have not been re-presented, leaving these experiential 
memories dormant. 
This finding is consistent with Epstein et al.‟s (1999) assertion that “the experiential 
system operates in a context-specific manner,” while “responses influenced by the rational 
system, which operates according to context-free, abstract principles, should be more cross-
situationally consistent” ( p. 393). The reasonable, rational, System 2 takes control and 
constructs the memory on the best available information and most logical narrative in order to 
construct how interested one logically ought to have been.   
Those individuals in the unconscious-intuitive group do not have a well-formed rationale 
to compete with their experience. Instead, the UI condition created a vague, gist-level, affective 
response to each option, instead of discrete reasons for selecting an option. After two weeks, 
there were no (or at least fewer) reasons to interfere with the reconstruction of the affective gist. 
When faced with an evaluation of the experience, the descriptions of the video activated the 
unconscious-intuitive System 1, because the conscious-rational System 2 had no specific, logical 
reasons to use as fodder.  
This interpretation is not without precedent. Research with Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT; 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) indicates that information that is processed and gestated at the gist-
level is more easily and accurately recalled than information processed on a specific, verbatim 
level (Reyna & Mills, 2007). FTT stipulates that gist-level experiences are more amenable to 
meaning-making than are verbatim data. In fact, relying on gists during the decision-making 
process is a hallmark of expertise (Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). In the current study, the UI group was 
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forced to form gist-level appraisals of the options through the stimulus immersion procedure 
(exposing participants to the descriptors for two seconds each), and prevented from conscious, 
verbatim processing through the anagram distracter task. 
Placed within the context of FTT, this finding suggests that verbatim memories of the 
video event may have interfered with the complex meaning making and high-bandwidth 
nonconscious processing following the event. The UI condition forced individuals to act like 
experts by creating gists and precluding verbatim processing.  
General Discussion 
A general picture has emerged from the available data that speaks to the two research 
questions that base this experiment. The results are preliminary, and the interpretations offered 
are largely speculative. What follows is an attempt to draw general conclusions based on rough 
trends elicited from the analyses so that they can then be applied in the service of the goals of the 
study, which will be discussed in turn. 
In commonly encountered, unstructured decision-making situations, previous 
engagement experiences seemed to matter. This is not to say, however, that these unstructured 
situations produced better decisions; they did not. In fact, there is some reason to believe that 
individuals in these situations chose more poorly than those who were forced to engage in either 
unconscious or conscious thought before deciding. Furthermore, these individuals are likely to 
misremember the event to be more like their expectation of it than the experience of it. Those 
who adopted a decision-as-usual strategy did not choose well, did not remember the event 
accurately, and relied on a catchall fund of engagement-related knowledge in order to make 
adaptive decisions.   
 
-88- 
 
In situations that provoke a reductionistic, conscious-rational decision-making process, 
previous levels of engagement behavior seem to matter less – although it was not entirely 
inconsequential. It is somewhat unclear how advantageous such a strategy is for choice quality, 
but it appears to inhibit accurate recall of the event. Again, it seems as though individuals who 
engage in this strategy remember not what they experienced, but what they ought to have 
experienced based on a logical analysis of available reasons. Those who adopted a conscious-
rational decisional strategy chose fairly well but did not remember the event accurately. The 
structure of this condition rendered the positive effects of engagement fairly mute.  
In situations that provoke a holistic, affective, unconscious-intuitive decision-making 
process, level of previous engagement did not seem to matter at all – the correlation of 
engagement with outcome variables was essentially zero. There is reason to believe that this 
strategy (i.e., stimulus immersion followed by nonconscious thought) is more effective than 
decisions-as-usual. Unlike the others, this strategy seemed to facilitate the accurate recall of 
events. Those who adopted an unconscious-intuitive decisional strategy chose somewhat better 
than the control group, remembered the event accurately, and did so regardless of previous level 
of engagement behaviors.  
Based on this appraisal, some comments can address the first research question: How 
does occupational engagement influence decision quality? By examining these conclusions 
through the prism of the vocational decision-making literature, the current study can supply more 
specificity than the omnibus statement that previous engagement behaviors seem to relate to 
subjective decisional outcomes. It is striking that previous engagement behaviors were found to 
be helpful only for the control condition, which had the lowest interest profile across time. 
Producing an unconscious-intuitive decisional strategy was intended to activate the powerful 
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nonconscious System 1. By doing so, this procedure also mimicked a stimulus rich environment 
that is the hallmark of engagement. The Trilateral Model (Krieshok et al., 2009) suggests that a 
highly engaged decisional strategy will be maximally effective.  
Krieshok, and colleagues (2009) define engagement as “taking part in decision making 
behaviors that contribute to the career decision-makers fund of information and experience of the 
larger world, not just the world as processed when a career decision is imminent” (p. 285).  This 
“fund” serves as a base about general conditions that may lead to participant interest. Presumably, 
although unstated by the authors, this databank consists of rewards and punishments wrought by 
thousands of daily decisions. These findings suggest that, all things being equal, this fund of 
knowledge is a valuable asset - under usual conditions previous engagement behaviors were 
shown to relate to choice quality. Those with a diffuse base of knowledge about how to choose in 
general, and have rich experiences of themselves and the world were well served. The 
unconscious-intuitive condition, however, created immediate engagement regarding this choice. 
No matter how habitually engaged the individual, previous engagement experiences represent 
only a general education. For specific lessons, one must go and engage the world to inform this 
specific choice, examining these specific options. The UI condition forced individuals to do 
exactly this. Immediate engagement through stimulus immersion funded the unconscious-
intuitive system, and this information was immediately useful for the novel situation at hand.   
This interpretation of the findings is consistent with Krieshok et al.‟s (2009) description 
of engagement as consisting of two components: enrichment and exploration. The authors 
conceptualized enrichment as a means of making “experientially informed decision making at 
many and various points in the future” (p. 286). This refers to the benefit of having knowledge 
base generated by engagement behaviors. The relationship between engagement and during-
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video and follow-up interest scores both overall and for the control group are indicative of this 
function of engagement. Engagement, in this case, represented a trait-like repository of 
knowledge. 
The second component, exploration, is conceptualized as the cyclical process of 
behaviors that lead to a career decision. This process was produced when the structure of 
conscious-rational and unconscious-intuitive conditions were imposed. This structure allowed 
the individual to interact more richly (especially in the UI condition) with the material related to 
this particular decision, and thus produce a (marginally) better decision over time. Engagement, 
in this case, represents a state-like behavioral inclination.  
The second research question guiding this study addresses the profiles of interest scores 
over time. It is clear that the unconscious-intuitive and the conscious-rational conditions were 
more similar than expected, especially when examining interest levels at the during-video time 
point. The similar performance of the two may be a result of participants‟ failure to consciously 
deliberate while taking the video interest inventory that comprised the manipulation for 
conscious-rational condition. Participants may have responded quickly, without conscious 
thought, and based on “gut feelings.” If this is the case, it would result in an information 
processing strategy similar to the unconscious-intuitive condition. This possibility will be 
discussed further in the limitations section to follow.  
Regardless of how participants approached the conscious-rational condition, it did apply 
some structure to the decision, by creating equal weights for each of the descriptions. 
Unconscious Thought Theory dictates that dysfunctional weighting of attributes is a fundamental 
weakness of the conscious thought system, while unconscious thought supplies “natural” weights 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). It is possible that the stratification of the results between 
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conditions observed represents this difference. The natural weights attached by the unconscious-
intuitive system are slightly better to the flat weights applied by the structure of the conscious-
rational condition inventory, which are slightly better than the poor weights attached by 
decisions-as-usual. Individuals may not decide as well when forced to define and weigh their 
own reasons for choosing or not choosing an option.   
The two-week follow-up interest assessment represents a conscious recollection of 
participant experience of the video. The interest levels at this point can be viewed as an indicator 
of the meaning participants have made of their experience. As such, congruence between interest 
ratings at the time of experience and those at follow-up reveals that an experience has been 
successfully incorporated into consciously held self-schemas. Many dual-processing theories 
(Wilson, 2002; Gilbert, 2006) postulate strongly held theories of self are highly resistant to 
change, even in the face of repeated disconfirmatory experiences (e.g., Wilson, 2002).  
Findings in this study are largely consistent with this conclusion. In this case, the fact that 
every group was pleasantly surprised by their interest levels during the video can be considered 
evidence that their experience of the event contrasted their expectation. Essentially, each group 
was more interested in the video than they thought they would be. However, individuals who 
actively contemplated how much they ought to have been interested given a rational (for the CR 
condition) or usual response set (control condition) displayed a significant disparity between 
their experience of the video and their recollection of it. Participants in these groups did not 
incorporate the new data - the surprising interest they had in their video - into their conscious 
self-schemas. Adopting an unconscious-intuitive decisional strategy appears to protect against 
disruptions in meaning making. 
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As individuals move through the world, they make conscious choices based on 
fundamental views of self. Humans strive for predictability, and that desire often begins with the 
belief that we are stable, consistent people (Eagleman, 2011). The tendency to remember one‟s 
past self as more similar to one‟s current self is called the “consistency bias” (see Ariely, 2008). 
This belief is both anxiety reducing and a natural by-product of our symbolic, essentialist nature 
(Bloom, 2010). Consistency in identity, however, may result in the unrealistic decoupling of 
one‟s unconscious personality, inclinations that are constantly changing based on feedback from 
the environment, and one‟s conscious personality, which is guided by our self-narrative (Wilson, 
2002). Conscious decisions may not produce the affective responses one logically expects.  
Having affective experiences, such as watching an interesting video, are valuable 
learning experiences and can aid in future occupational and educational choices. These findings 
suggest, however, those making conscious-rational and decisions-as-usual do not incorporate 
these types of experiences well. Instead, when choices are made after structured (e.g., the CR 
condition) or unstructured (e.g., the control condition) deliberation, individuals are likely to fall 
into the consistency bias, remembering an event as they would predict based on conscious self-
knowledge. In essence, they construe the event as if it had never happened. They expect a certain 
level of interest based on a logical simulation, then experience an event that does not conform to 
that simulation. When recalling that event, the mentally re-simulate it using the same logic. This 
leads them to the same expectation they initially had.  
This set of events, if accurate, represents a failure to incorporate new learning 
experiences into consciously held narratives and results in a static occupational and vocational 
identity. This information is very valuable to those interested in promoting vocational flexibility 
and adaptability. Stasis is diametrically opposed to adaptability. Adaptable workers are 
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constantly in flux, learning, shifting and changing to avail themselves of new opportunities and 
keep up with a changing workspace. Conscious-rational decisions seem to feed into a self-
fulfilling prophecy and create a distorted, cyclical feedback loop. Engagement and affective-gist 
formation are potential keys to breaking this cycle.  
Together, these findings reveal that occupational/educational choices should not be 
viewed as a single point of commitment, but only one small part of a larger process. The decider 
brings with them a fund of knowledge about themselves and the world as well as a 
characterological proclivity to engage (or not) with their environment. More importantly, 
however, positive effects seem to spring from a rich, immersive interaction with data informing 
that particular decision. This study provides foundational support for this contention: The 
manner in which individuals process relevant information preceding a decision will influence 
both the short- and long-term effects of that decision. This is valuable information for decision-
makers of all stripes, but it is particularly imperative for those professionals tasked to help 
decision-makers optimize their choices, such as career counselors.  
Implications for Practice 
  At the broadest level, the portrait painted by the general interpretation of the results 
supports the conclusion that vocational psychology would benefit from shifting into a post-
rational account of human decision-making (Krieshok et al., 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). 
Such shifts have explicitly been identified in fields such as economics (Ariely, 2008), 
psychotherapy (Hastie & Dawes, 2010), philosophy (e.g., Fearn, 2001), and marketing (e.g., 
Lindstrom, 2010). Krieshok et al.‟s (2009) Trilateral Model and Krieshok‟s (2001) Anti-
Introspectivist approach represent theoretical steps in this direction. Based on these theories, 
several general recommendations for practice, such as increasing occupational engagement and 
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emphasizing motivational interventions, have been forwarded (e.g., Krieshok et al., 2011). The 
findings of this study offer experimental support for several specific, actionable suggestions for 
career counselors that are fully congruent with these recommendations.   
 First, decision-makers benefit from the knowledge base gained from experiential 
engagement. Active, reciprocal interactions with the environment vis-à-vis one‟s occupational 
and educational interests are associated with better choices. This should be viewed as a long-
term, ongoing process. Fostering such behaviors is likely to be most efficient on an institutional 
level. Parents, teachers, administrators and managers can be educated as to the beneficial effects 
of environments designed to facilitate various modes of engagement, such as discussing interests, 
shadowing professionals, networking, and informational interviews. Structured environments 
that promote continued activities in such a vein will allow individuals to build a repository of 
self-referent educational/occupational knowledge. This database provides a foundation of 
knowledge useful in common, unstructured decisions.  
 It is important to note that not all engagement activities are equally informative. Those 
events that are emotionally immersive and highly interactive result in more information-rich 
experiences than those that are more one-dimensional, cognitive endeavors. The single best way 
to know if someone is interested by a task is to have them do that task. Mentally simulating 
events through deliberating or talking about it may be misleading, as our mental models of self 
and world may not be entirely accurate. Checking these predictions against bona fide experiences 
of the vocational or learning environment is necessary. Decision-makers should be taught, as a 
general rule, to trust experience over cognitions (Hayes et al., 1999).  
 The reality of career counseling, however, does not easily lend itself to drastic paradigm 
shifts. All things being equal, a career counselor may do little more than hope that their 
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counselee has built a fund of knowledge. Regardless of their level of previous engagement, 
though, the findings of this study suggest that applying an engagement-oriented protocol to the 
decision at hand can be extremely helpful. Weighty, difficult choices, such as those facing career 
counseling clients, are precisely those that are commonly believed to necessitate the long, 
conscious deliberation of available options (Klein, 2003). Traditionally recommended decision-
making interventions, like creating a pros and cons list (i.e., Janis & Mann, 1977), imply that the 
hard work of choosing occurs during a decision. It is believed the difficulty lies in examining, 
comparing, and weighing options. In contrast, the results of this study suggest that the hard work 
of choosing occurs well before the decision. The difficulty lies in seeking out and immersing 
oneself in rich environments that will inform that decision. Mulling, introspecting and 
committing may not cut it. The most effective decisions occur only after throwing oneself into an 
experience. The point of commitment is not hard if you have gathered the appropriate 
information.  
 Career counselors are in a unique position to train deciders to become disciplined pre-
decisional information gatherers. Students need to be motivated to entertain engagement as a 
viable option to commitment. This can be difficult, as engaging requires investment of time and 
energy, as well as psychological and social risks. While engaged, it is best for the client to forgo 
judgmental cognitions when possible. This strategy explicitly places unconscious, affective gist 
formation above conscious-rational deliberation. Mindfulness techniques have been designed to 
increase awareness of here-and-now experiences, and circumvent the natural inclination to 
categorize, reduce, symbolize, judge and foreclose (Hayes et al., 1999). Directly opposed to 
common career interventions, the findings of these studies suggest clients may have to work hard 
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to avoid making lists, direct comparisons, quantifications, and reasons they ought to like a 
particular activity.  
These interventions may feel paradoxical. Clients are asked to be very behaviorally active 
while remaining judgmentally passive.  This will almost certainly be accompanied by anxiety, 
because unlike interventions that rely on conscious, rational deliberation, clients do not have 
access to the unconscious fund of knowledge. Engagement behaviors that fund intuition are not 
amenable to relatable, identifiable milestones en route to making a decision. The counselor, in 
fact, may advocate actively reducing decision-making during the engagement phase of 
counseling. Failure to live with anxiety can result in premature foreclosure that is neither 
adaptive nor optimal. Krieshok (1998) notes that being undecided in not necessarily a bad thing, 
but it may feel that way.  
These findings also suggest that traditional interest inventories may be helpful, as they 
may help individuals avoid mis-weighing attributes of the various options. However, when 
employed, care should be taken to ensure participants do not use a hyper-rational approach either 
to the test itself or to the options generated by the test. They should approach the test in a non-
deliberative fashion. Then, if they engage with any of the proposed activities, they should not 
approach them with a desire to confirm or disconfirm the results of the test. This, however, may 
be difficult, as our conscious thoughts tend toward predecisional distortion (Carlson & Russo, 
2001). These tests certainly have benefits, but they also seem to produce some unwanted and 
unhelpful effects on the decision-makers.  
In a very general sense, clients may benefit from being reminded that the best and biggest 
decisions they have faced did not really feel like decisions at all. The path they selected was 
taken because it was simply and obviously the best for them. It may not have been the only 
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option, but a covert, nonconscious information processing mechanism produced a strong feeling 
of „knowing‟ (e.g., Klein, 2003). Perhaps occupational and vocational decisions are much the 
same. We decide best only after we have had such rich interactions with the options that we 
simply „know‟ without constructing reasons or rationales, which only end up getting in the way. 
Limitations  
There are a number of limitations to the current study. First, in general, tests of between 
group mean differences were not as persuasive as expected. Trends were observed, but group 
differences were not as definitive as has been found in previous studies with similar or smaller 
sample sizes (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 
1991). As this study focused on the applicability of social psychological theory to vocational 
practice, matters of external validity were given some precedent over matters of internal validity. 
Potency of intervention and control were sacrificed in lieu of ecological legitimacy and 
generalizability. 
Two aspects of methodology are prominent in this regard. First, although individuals 
were forced to interact with the material in a manner expected to produce a particular 
information processing strategy, there were no controls on the manner in which they interacted 
with the material upon reaching the decision page (Appendix G). At that point, those in the 
unconscious-intuitive condition could have adopted a very rational or decision-as-usual approach, 
or vice versa. Second, the manipulation within the current study was not especially potent. It 
consisted only of about five minutes of interaction with the material. Such a brief, one-time 
interaction may not have been potent enough, given the decisional freedom given to participants, 
to produce the desired information processing response sets.  
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In a similar vein, the event chosen by the participant was clearly of little consequence to 
their lives, as they were well informed the video would only last about fifteen minutes. Had the 
effects of the decision been long lasting and comprised repeated encounters, between group 
effects may have been more pronounced. Surely participants formed some level of interest or 
disinterest during their fifteen minute video, but this effect would have been compounded had it 
been a three hour college course. In other words, a boring fifteen minute video may be judged to 
be fairly uninteresting (i.e., a fairly poor choice), but a boring class three hours a week for a full 
semester would likely be judged as incredibly uninteresting (i.e., a very poor choice).  
Another limitation springs from the challenges of operationalizing the theoretical 
arguments girding this study. One of the assumptions of this study is that conscious reports of 
interest in an event may be misleading (e.g., Krieshok, 1998). The dependent variables of interest 
in this study, however, were assessed in precisely such a fashion. Un-numbered bipolar graphic 
rating scales were used to reduce the potential for the quantifications and judgments that are 
hallmarks of conscious-rational thought. Nonetheless, it is possible that all of the dependent 
variables, regardless of group, may be considered conscious-rational appraisals of interest 
thereby confounding analyses based on this data. Some researchers have circumvented this 
problem by directly assessing brain scans (e.g., Lindstrom, 2010) or physiological stress 
reactions (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997). Given the covert nature of interest, there are few options 
other than some form of self-report. Further, the recollection of the event at the two-week 
follow-up may have been influenced by other factors, such as if the participant just took a test or 
was very hungry. Mood was not assessed or controlled for at the follow-up. These were 
mitigated where possible, but not eliminated by the methods of this study.  
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Although not a limitation, per se, another consideration is the representativeness of the 
current sample. The average Occupational Engagement Scale – Student scale score was 
significantly higher than the average obtained from the college population on which the 
instrument was normed. This indicates that this group had a higher than expected level of pre-
existing engagement. Increased OES scores may be due to summer collection times. Students 
taking summer classes may be more willing to invest in their educational and occupational 
futures. As a group, the participants in the current study may have been better able to make 
occupational and vocational decisions. The possibility exists that better overall choices across all 
groups may have constricted group differences, and rendered the observation of group difference 
more difficult.   
Finally, the most important limitation of this study remains a poorly formulated 
understanding of the manipulations involved. Dual-process models of human cognition are 
highly theoretical, and the problems associated with manipulating and measuring them remain 
ample. The methodology herein was cobbled together to create a standard manipulation that was 
expected to accomplish the induction of unconscious-intuitive and conscious-rational approaches.  
The extent to which this was accomplished is somewhat unknown. For instance, it is 
expected that many participants did not attend to the material displayed in the unconscious-
intuitive condition, and instead used a highly conscious-rational approach upon getting to the 
decision page. Likewise, it is possible that most of the participants in the conscious-rational 
condition did not adopt a hyper-rational, deliberative approach to the items of the interest 
inventory. The inventory may have, in fact, been completed very quickly, based on „gut-feelings‟ 
and with little thought. Rapid responses and the structure added by the inventory may have 
actually reduced the use of the heuristics and biases that accompany conscious-rational decisions. 
 
-100- 
 
Such an interpretation would explain why the conscious-rational and unconscious-intuitive 
conditions performed so similarly, and the unstructured deliberation involved in the control 
condition performed considerably worse. In short, the state of the research is in an exploratory 
stage and there are no reliable ways of distinguishing conscious-rational and unconscious-
intuitive approaches. There is some question as to whether the experimental conditions produced 
the desired information processing strategies, and this is especially true for the conscious-rational 
condition.  
Future Directions 
 The current study has produced a starting point for future research. Primarily, this study 
needs to be replicated or augmented with more participants. A replication of the patterns found 
herein would lend credence to the interpretations of this study. Provided future studies support 
the general conclusions of this study, two future directions are possible. The first would be to 
increase the potency of the manipulation on the front end of an experiment of this type. The 
second would be to increase the consequences of the choice on the back end of such an 
experiment. Each of these will be discussed in turn.  
 First, by exercising experimenter control, more potent unconscious-intuitive and 
conscious-rational conditions may be created. For the unconscious-intuitive condition, pictures 
could be added to the background of the slides to which the UI condition participants were 
exposed. This would increase the richness of the stimuli and would theoretically aid in gist-level 
formations about the option. This would support the contention that the richness of an experience 
– the greater engagement of the unconscious-intuitive system – creates an environment more 
conducive to adaptive decision-making. For the conscious-rational condition, a more potent 
intervention could be accomplished by forcing participants to take more time and think 
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deliberately when taking the interest inventory. Also, this could be accomplished by eliminating 
the structure imposed by the conscious-rational inventory, and having participants create their 
own list of reasons to or not to choose a certain option. This may induce a “truer” conscious-
rational decisional strategy than was displayed here.  
 The second modification to the current methodology would be to expand participant 
contact with the option they have chosen. In the current study, participants had only one fifteen 
minute interaction with the video they chose. When deciders choose courses, majors or jobs, 
however, they obviously have repeated, prolonged exposure to the events they have chosen. 
Replicating this aspect of decisions would be instructional, as the results of the current study 
indicate that effects (i.e., interest levels) of the decisional strategies become more disparate over 
time. Repeated exposure in the form of a series of lectures may exacerbate differences in 
outcomes. In addition, knowing that this would affect more than a single fifteen minute section 
of their lives may change the way participants approach the decision, especially in the control 
condition. Such a study would be more externally valid, as it better represents the high-stakes, 
long-term nature of most of the educational and occupational decisions faced by clients that 
arrive in career counseling.  
Finally, it is interesting to consider the type of descriptions used to identify and contrast 
options. Different descriptions may inspire different forms of information processing. Vallacher 
and Wegner‟s (1987) theory of action identification supposes that individuals describe events 
differently based on a number of psychological variables. A soldier may describe combat as any 
of the following: “fighting for freedom,” “defending a hill,” and “firing a weapon.” Some are 
more abstract and inspire affect (e.g., “fighting for freedom”), while others are very concrete and 
mechanical (“firing a weapon”). It would be interesting to determine how using level of action 
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identification as a variable would impact interest forecasts and the creation of unconscious-
intuitive or conscious-rational information processing strategies. For instance, someone may be 
very interested in the medical field because it was described as “saving lives.” The same person, 
however, may not be interested in job that involves “removing human organs.” 
 It is likely that abstract descriptions, such as “saving lives” may activate the symbolic, 
narrative system. Participants may believe they ought to like such prompts based on how they 
view themselves. Concrete descriptions, such as “removing organs” may activate the more 
visceral, unconscious system. It would be fascinating to better understand how symbolic, long-
term goals affect interest forecasting.  
Conclusion 
Each person is an expert in what they find interesting and what they do not. Everyone, 
especially by the time they get to college, has had ample chances to learn what kinds of activities 
bore them and which enthrall them. It is simply a matter of creating the conditions that, when 
faced with novel decisions, unlock this expertise.  
It appears as though engagement activities preceding a decision are extremely valuable. 
Those that have occurred in the distant past create a helpful foundation when faced with similar 
scenarios. Those that occur within the context of this decision - the one facing the individual 
currently – are even more valuable, as they are specific to the context at hand.  
Actually going out into the world and experiencing the options uses the rich, full self. 
Immersive experience activates both the unconscious and conscious systems. These experiences 
are extremely informative, and produce better results than simply mentally simulating an event. 
Furthermore, when we approach decisions this way, they have a tendency to “stick” better, and 
are less diluted or distorted by time.  
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Appendix B 
  
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Demographics 
 
Age: ______      Gender:             □  Female □  Male  
High School GPA (4.0 Scale): ______  College GPA (4.0 Scale): ______    
ACT Score: ______ SAT Score: ______  # Credit Hrs Completed: ______  
       (not including current courses) 
Year in school:            □  1st   □  2nd   □  3rd   □  4th   □  5+ 
Do you expect to graduate on time?       □  Yes  □  No 
 
 
What is your official college major? _________________________________________     
   -OR-      □  Undecided 
 
IF you listed a major above, please answer this question: 
How DECIDED would you say you are?  
  □  Officially Decided, but that could easily be Undecided. 
  □  Officially Decided, but it would not surprise me if I changed majors before I graduate. 
  □  Pretty Decided. I am fairly sure this is the major I want to graduate in. 
  □  Totally Decided. I can’t imagine changing majors.  
 
IF you checked UNDECIDED, please answer this question: 
How UNDECIDED would you say you are? 
  □  Officially Undecided, but I am pretty sure about what I am going to major in. 
  □  Still Undecided, but I have narrowed it down to just a few things. 
  □  Pretty Undecided, but I’m not freaked out about it. 
  □  Totally Undecided. At this point I don’t have a clue as to what I should major in.  
  
 
How do you identify? Check all that apply. 
□  American Indian or Native American   □  Mexican or Mexican American 
□  Asian, Asian American or Pacific Islander  □  Puerto Rican  
□  Black or African American    □  Other Hispanic or Latino 
□  White (non-Hispanic)     □  Multiracial 
□  Other      □  I prefer not to respond 
Are you an International Student?  □  Yes  □  No 
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Appendix C 
Occupational Engagement Scale - Student
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Appendix D 
Rational-Experiential Inventory - Short 
 
Please circle one number to indicate how true or false you find the following statements.  
 
 Completely 
False 
 Completely 
True 
1) I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. 1 2 3 4 5 
2) I believe in trusting my hunches. 1 2 3 4 5 
3) I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking 
abilities rather than something that requires little thought. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4) I trust my initial feelings about people. 1 2 3 4 5 
5) Thinking hard and for long time about something gives me 
little satisfaction. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6) I prefer complex to simple problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
7) When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my 
"gut feelings." 
1 2 3 4 5 
8) I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I 
can't explain how I know. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9) I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about 
something. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10) My initial impressions of people are almost always right. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix E 
Sample Graphic Rating Scale 
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Appendix F 
Links to Video Options 
Video A 
Technology, Entertainment, and Design (Producer). (2005). Eva Vertes looks to the future of 
medicine [Online Talk]. Available from http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/eva_ 
vertes_looks _to_the_future_of_medicine.html.  
Video B 
Technology, Entertainment, and Design (Producer). (2010). Joseph Nye on global power shifts. 
[Online Talk]. Available from http://www.ted.com/talks/joseph_nye_on_global_power_ 
shifts.html.  
Video C 
Technology, Entertainment, and Design (Producer). (2006). Ken Robinson says schools kill 
creativity [Online Talk]. Available from http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/ken_ 
robinson_says_schools_kill_creativity.html. 
Video D 
Technology, Entertainment, and Design (Producer). (2003). Seth Godin on standing out [Online 
Talk]. Available from http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/seth_godin_on_ 
sliced_bread.html. 
Video E 
Technology, Entertainment, and Design (Producer). (2009). Alwar Balasubramaniam: Art of 
absence and substance [Online Talk]. http://www.ted.com/talks/alwar_ 
balasubramaniam_sculpture_of_substance_and_absence.html.  
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Video F 
Technology, Entertainment, and Design (Producer). (2009). Garik Isrealian on how spectroscopy 
could reveal alien life [Online Talk]. http://www.ted.com/talks/garik_israelian_what_s_ 
inside_a_star.html. 
Video G 
Technology, Entertainment, and Design (Producer). (2003). George Dyson at the birth of the 
computer [Online Talk]. Available from http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/ 
george_dyson_at_the_birth_of_the_computer.html.  
Video H 
Technology, Entertainment, and Design (Producer). (2004). Susan Savage-Rumbaugh on apes 
[Online Talk]. Available. from http://www.ted.com/talks/susan_savage_rumbaugh_ 
on_apes_that_write.html.  
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Appendix G 
 
Decision Sheet 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are the descriptions of the 8 video choices.  Review the choices and CIRCLE the 
ONE video you believe will interest you most.  
 
 
 
You will watch this video in a few moments. 
 VIDEO A  VIDEO B  
 Medicine  
Researching cancer  
Human anatomy  
Experimenting on tissue  
Healing illness  
 
Politics  
Studying economic power  
Developing foreign policy  
Examining government regulations  
Promoting international cooperation  
 
     
 VIDEO C  VIDEO D  
 Teaching  
Fostering creativity  
Reforming educational systems  
Interacting with children  
Developing children’s talents  
 
Marketing  
Designing advertising campaigns  
Examining customer habits  
Persuading consumers  
Selling products  
 
     
 VIDEO E  VIDEO F  
 Sculpting  
Creating art  
Visual perception of objects  
Crafting with one’s hands  
Creating beautiful works  
 
Astronomy  
Analyzing starlight  
Examining chemical elements  
Interpreting scientific data  
Searching for alien planets  
 
     
 VIDEO G  VIDEO H  
 Technology  
First software programs  
Computers  
History of artificial intelligence  
Creating faster information processors 
 
Animal communication  
Researching animal groups  
Great Apes  
Human-animal interaction  
Learning about animal abilities  
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Appendix H 
Tables 
Table 1 
 
Standardization of video descriptions.   
 
 
Category 
Video Field General Action Specific Action Object  Goal 
A Medicine 
Researching 
Cancer 
Experimenting on 
Tissue 
Human 
Anatomy 
Healing Illness 
B Politics 
Studying 
Economic Power 
Examining 
Government 
Regulations 
Developing 
Foreign Policy 
Promoting 
International 
Cooperation 
C Teaching 
Reforming 
Educational 
Systems 
Interacting with 
Children 
Fosters 
Creativity 
Developing 
Children‟s 
Talents 
D Marketing 
Desigining 
Advertising 
Campaigns 
Persuading 
Customers 
Examining 
Consumers 
Habits 
Selling 
Products 
E Sculpting Creating Art 
Crafting with 
one‟s hands 
Visual 
Perception of 
Objects 
Creating 
Beautiful 
Works 
F Astronomy 
Analyzes 
Starlight 
Interpreting 
Scientific Data 
Examining 
Chemical 
Elements 
Searching for 
Alien Planets 
G Technology 
First Software 
Programs 
History of 
Artificial 
Intelligence 
Computers 
Creating Faster 
Information 
Processors 
H 
Animal 
Communication 
Researches 
Animal Groups 
Relates to Non-
Human Species 
Apes 
Learning about 
Animal 
Abilities 
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Table 2 
Summary of study variables.   
Variable Type Metric Description 
Experimental 
Condition 
Independent -- Random Assignment, 3 Groups 
Mood Covariate 
50-point graphic 
rating scale 
One self-report item 
REI-NFC Covariate 5-point Likert scale Sum of 5 self-report items 
REI-FI Covariate 5-point Likert scale Sum of 5 self-report items 
Video Quality Covariate 
50-point graphic 
rating scales 
Average during-video interest 
level for each video 
OES 
Covariate, 
Predictor 
5-point Likert scale Sum of 14 self-report items 
Pre-Video Interest 
Covariate, 
Dependent 
50-point graphic 
rating scale 
One self-report item 
During-Video 
Interest 
Dependent 
50-point graphic 
rating scales 
Average of 3 self-report items: 
interest after 6 minutes, 12 
minutes, and immediately 
following video 
Follow-up Interest Dependent 
50-point graphic 
rating scale One self-report item 
Note. Rational-Experiential Inventory – Need for Closure Subscale (REI-NFC) and Rational 
Experiential Inventory – Faith in Intuition Subscale (REI-FI) are from Epstein et al., 1994. 
Occupational Engagement Scale-Student (OES) is from Cox, 2008.  
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Table 3 
 
Statistical description of study variables.  
Variable N 
Potential 
Range 
Observed 
Range 
Mean 
(SD) 
Skew Kurtosis 
Mood 136 1 – 50 1 – 50 36.79 
(8.53) 
-1.03 1.83 
REI-NFC 136 5 – 25 9 – 25 
19.15 
(3.63) 
-.33 -.58 
REI-FI 136 5 – 25 6 – 25 
17.91 
(3.73) 
-.66 .94 
Video Quality 8 1 – 50 
33.75 - 
46.60 
40.45 
(3.59) 
-.07 -.15 
OES 136 0 – 56 15 – 54 
37.83 
(9.46) 
-.38 -.50 
Pre-Video Interest 135 1 – 50 5 – 50 
38.70 
(8.12) 
-1.02 1.58 
During-Video 
Interest 
136 1 – 50 1 – 50 
40.43 
(9.77) 
-1.73 3.40 
Follow-up Interest 115 1 – 50 2 – 50 
39.01 
(10.70) -1.49 2.11 
Note. Rational-Experiential Inventory – Need for Closure Subscale (REI-NFC) and Rational 
Experiential Inventory – Faith in Intuition Subscale (REI-FI) are from Epstein et al., 1994. 
Occupational Engagement Scale-Student (OES) is from Cox, 2008.  
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Table 4 
Mean video quality scores and number of participant selections per condition.  
 Video Quality  Number of Participant Selections 
 Mean SD  Control CR UI All 
Video A 41.0 7.71  5 3 9 17 
Video B 37.57 13.78  7 5 6 18 
Video C 42.67 6.75  5 6 5 16 
Video D 39.17 10.52  8 5 3 16 
Video E 33.75 11.91  5 5 6 16 
Video F 41.04 9.75  3 3 10 16 
Video G 40.56 6.59  4 9 4 17 
Video H 46.60 4.47  8 7 5 20 
All 40.48 8.85  45 43 48 136 
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Table 5 
Correlation matrix for the study variables.  
  Variable 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Mood 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
--       
2. REI-NFC 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.30 
.001 
136 
--      
3. REI-FI 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
-.05 
.59 
136 
-.13 
.13 
136 
--     
4. Video 
Quality 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.09 
.30 
136 
.001 
.97 
136 
-.05 
.56 
136 
--    
5. OES 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.23 
.01 
136 
.27 
.001 
136 
.09 
.29 
136 
-.01 
.93 
136 
--   
6. Pre-Video 
Interest 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.39 
.001 
135 
.29 
.001 
135 
.02 
.85 
135 
-.04 
.66 
135 
.27 
.002 
135 
--  
7. During-
Video 
Interest 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.32 
.001 
136 
.23 
.01 
136 
-.01 
.88 
136 
.37 
.001 
136 
.31 
.001 
136 
.30 
.001 
135 
-- 
8. Follow-up 
Interest 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.30 
.001 
115 
.28 
.002 
115 
.05 
.57 
115 
.34 
.001 
115 
.32 
.001 
115 
.39 
.001 
114 
.93 
.001 
115 
Note. Rational Experiential Inventory – Need for Closure Subscale (REI-NFC) and 
Rational Experiential Inventory – Faith in Intuition Subscale (REI-FI) are from Epstein et 
al., 1994. Occupational Engagement Scale-Student (OES) is from Cox, 2008.  
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Table 6 
Correlations between OES-Student scores and interest scores. 
 
    During-Video   Follow-up 
  
Partial 
Correlation 
Partial, including 
Pre-video Interest 
 Partial 
Correlation 
Partial, including 
Pre-video Interest 
All 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.26 
.005 
115 
.24 
.01 
107 
 .22 
.02 
115 
.20 
.04 
107 
Control 
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.40 
.02 
38 
.41 
.02 
38 
 .37 
.03 
38 
.39 
.03 
38 
Conscious-
Rational  
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.23 
.18 
39 
.21 
.22 
39 
 .22 
.19 
39 
.18 
.31 
39 
Unconscious-
Intuitive  
Corr. 
Sig. 
N 
.16 
.38 
38 
.08 
.69 
37 
 .06 
.75 
38 
.01 
.98 
37 
Note. Partial correlation controlled for the effects of mood, Rational Experiential Inventory - 
Need for Closure subscale (REI-NFC), Rational Experiential Inventory - Faith in Intuition 
subscale (REI-FI) and video quality.  
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Table 7  
Statistical descriptions of behavioral indicators of interest. 
   
Mean 
(SD) 
Item 
Possible 
Range 
Observed 
Range 
Control 
(N = 38) 
CR 
(N = 39) 
UI 
(N = 38) 
All 
(N = 115) 
Amount thought about 
content of video 
1 - 50 1 – 50 
23.32 
(14.39) 
26.54 
(15.28) 
28.97 
(16.28) 
26.28 
(14.43) 
Likelihood to seek out 
more information about 
the content of video 
1 - 50 1 – 50 
32.47 
(16.52) 
33.59 
(17.26) 
33.74 
(16.03) 
33.27 
(16.48) 
Already sought out more 
information 
0 - 1 
(yes or no) 
-- 
11 
(28.9%) 
14 
(35.9%) 
9 
(23.7%) 
34 
(29.6%) 
Number of times discussed 
content of video 
Free 
response 
0 – 15 
1.74 
(1.56) 
2.54 
(2.91) 
1.94 
(1.62) 
2.08 
(2.15) 
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Appendix I 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesis 3: Expected patterns of interest between groups over time.  
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Figure 2. Raw mean group interest scores over time. 
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Figure 3. Group mean interest scores after adjusting for mood, OES, REI-NFC, REI-FI, and 
video quality.  
 
